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Abstract 
 This work discusses three counties in Georgia during the secession crisis from 
Abraham Lincoln‟s election in November 1860 until Georgia seceded from the Union in 
January 1861.  The focus of this paper originally began with Thomas County, Georgia, 
the only county in southwest Georgia not to vote for secession.  Research began with the 
simple idea of finding out why Thomas County‟s citizens opposed secession.  Dougherty 
and Muscogee counties were included to add a broader scope to the research and make 
the paper more useful for comparison to other counties in Georgia.  By using 
methodology consist with historical research, the conclusion of this paper is that the 
secession debate in Georgia was simply a continuation of the political fighting between 
Democrats and Whigs that had occurred in the state since the 1830s.  Thus, political 
allegiance played a vital role in determining support for, or opposition to, secession in 
these three counties. 
        
Introduction 
Not long after Abraham Lincoln‟s election as President in November 1860, a 
group of men convened a meeting in the southern part of Dougherty County, located in 
southwest Georgia.  Described as a group of mostly planters, that is, owners of twenty or 
more slaves, the purpose of the meeting was to decide what the people of the county 
should tell their state‟s leaders concerning the crisis. These Dougherty County citizens 
made it obvious what they wanted: “the most speedy and certain redress for all past and 
present political grievances, and the most sure guarantee against further 
aggressions…IMMEDIATE AND INDEPENDENT SECESSION.”  The fact that these 
men capitalized these last three words not only emphasizes their wants and desires but 
also emphasizes the internal debate in this and every Georgia county.  While they “would 
be glad to have Georgia unite with any one or more” of their fellow southern states in “a 
Southern Confederacy,” these men wanted action now.  They further felt that those who 
favored cooperation or outright Unionism were cowards and conspirators.  However, this 
language was not something new due to the crisis of the times.  In fact, the debate in 
Georgia over secession was a continuation of the political in-fighting that had occurred in 
the state for years.  Instead of being labeled Whigs and Democrats, the two warring 
factions were now called Cooperationists and Immediate Secessionists.  While past works 
on the secession crisis in Georgia have attributed the intense debate in the state to 
geography, class conflict, and sectionalism, most authors have failed to see the obvious: 
when it came down to it, the internal debate regarding secession was simply another 
battle of political allegiance.   
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The debates concerning why the South seceded began almost immediately and 
continue to this day.  Recent evidence has shown that there were divisions amongst 
southerners regarding secession.
1
  Nowhere was this truer than in Georgia.  While much 
of the South has been seen as having a one-party system, in Georgia a two-party system 
had emerged in the 1820s.
2
  This two-party system would stay intact and would end up 
being integral to sentiment regarding secession after Abraham Lincoln‟s election in 1860.  
Many former Whigs were opposed to secession while most Democrats were in favor of 
immediate secession from the Union, regardless of geography, social status, or economic 
standing.  This was most certainly the case in Dougherty, Muscogee, and Thomas 
counties, located in southwest Georgia.  The vast majority of Thomas County voters were 
opposed to secession, including many of the large slaveholders, who, in other areas, have 
often been seen as the main supporters of secession.  After examining numerous primary 
sources, but focusing on newspapers and memoirs, it becomes obvious that Thomas 
County citizens opposed secession primarily because of their political affiliation.  Their 
past support of Whig politicians ended up trumping their role as citizens of a county with 
a majority black population.  However, this same political affiliation provided the 
rationale for the large-scale support of secession in Dougherty and Muscogee counties, 
two Democratic strongholds.   Thus, this paper argues that political affiliation played a 
key role in determining the level of support for secession in these three Georgia counties.   
                                                 
1
   For a fairly thorough discussion of the historiography of the debates on why the Lower South seceded as 
it did, see Ralph A. Wooster, “The Secession of the Lower South: An Examination of Changing 
Interpretations,” Civil War History 7 (1961): 117-127.     
2
   See Seymour Martin Lipset, “The Emergence of the One-Party South: The Election of 1860,” in 
Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).  Some 
recent scholarship has disagreed with aspects of Lipset‟s thesis, but most scholars do not disagree with his 
overall conclusions.  Most important for this work is Peyton McCrary and others, “Class and Party in the 
Secession Crisis:  Voting Behavior in the Deep South, 1856-1861,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 8 
(Winter 1978), 429-457, which argues that Georgia and Alabama most certainly had two-party systems.  
Perhaps not coincidentally, those two states had close votes on secession. 
3 
 
 
 
 
The three counties were chosen for specific reasons. Thomas County was the 
original focus of the research for this study because Thomas County was literally the only 
county in southwest Georgia that voted for cooperationist candidates and opposed 
secession.  However, in order to expand the study, it was felt that at least two other 
counties should be added to the scope of the research.  When debating which counties to 
add to the study, several factors were considered including support of secession, 
geographic location, comparability to Thomas County in terms of population and 
economy, and the amount of sources available.  Dougherty was chosen because of its 
proximity to Thomas County, its similarity in population and economic make-up, and its 
large-scale support of secession, which was in direct contrast with Thomas.  Muscogee 
County was chosen because it was the largest southwest Georgia county in terms of 
population, economic strength, and sources available.  Furthermore, while Muscogee 
eventually voted for secessionist candidates by a large majority, the county still had many 
prominent, vocal cooperationists and even outright Unionists.  Thus, it was felt Muscogee 
represents a more middle-of-the-ground county than some other southwest Georgia 
counties that lacked sources.  In addition, due to Columbus, it was felt that Muscogee was 
a good example of a Georgia county with a large city and, thus, could be comparable to 
Bibb (Macon), Fulton (Atlanta), Richmond (Augusta), and Chatham (Savannah) counties.  
This would make the study more useful as a comparison for future examinations of the 
secession debate in Georgia.   
 The counties were also chosen based upon their population statistics, in order to 
attempt to make the study more universal to expand to other parts of Georgia and the 
Lower South.  Muscogee County was partially chosen because it had the highest 
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population of the southwest Georgia counties, but also because it had a population made 
up of less than 50 percent slaves.  Thomas and Dougherty counties, however, did have a 
majority population of slaves, but to differing degrees.  Thomas County had a population 
of roughly 56 percent slaves according to the 1860 Census while Dougherty County had a 
population of approximately 73 percent slaves on the eve of secession.  This makes all 
three counties better suited for a comparative study because they were not all alike, thus 
making the conclusions herein more effective.  Furthermore, Thomas County had a total 
population of just under 11,000 residents while Dougherty was smaller, with just over 
8,200 residents.  Muscogee was the third largest county (out of 132) in terms of 
population, Thomas was 26
th
 and Dougherty was 55
th
.  Thus, the counties are nicely 
interspersed in terms of total population, making them more useful for a comparison to 
other Georgia counties.
3
   
Despite Georgia‟s importance in the South as a whole, and as the leading Lower 
South state, there has only been one book-length study of the secession debate, Michael 
P. Johnson‟s Toward a Patriarchal Republic: The Secession of Georgia.   Published in 
1977, Johnson argues that slavery had risen to a priority even greater than that of 
preservation of the Union and that secession was a rational decision based upon the 
leadership of the planter elite.  Johnson further argues that the planters were motivated to 
do this because they feared fellow slaveholders, and especially non-slaveholders, could 
be won over by Republican rhetoric, especially in the form of patronage enticements.  
Essentially, secessionist leaders led Georgia out of the Union to forestall this potential 
internal discord.  While fitting many of Johnson‟s parameters , Thomas County did not fit 
                                                 
3
   University of Virginia Historical Census Browser, http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu/, accessed July 17, 
2009. 
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within his thesis as many of the surviving records show the planter elite in that county 
most assuredly did not support secession.   Johnson‟s work is insightful and engaging but 
does have some flaws in its interpretation.   For example, Johnson plays up class conflict 
as a reason for Georgia‟s secession much more than the evidence supports.  Furthermore, 
Johnson‟s assertion that immediate secessionists feared other white Georgians seems a 
drastic overstatement of the evidence Johnson has found, especially since the majority of 
the evidence contradicts Johnson.  That aside, this is the standard work on the topic, if for 
nothing else than the fact that no one else has tackled it.
4
 
 Another study that deals with the time period in detail is a dissertation by Luke 
Fain Crutcher.  Crutcher‟s “Disunity and Dissolution: The Georgia Parties and the Crisis 
of the Union, 1859-1861” makes a similar argument to this paper in that Crutcher asserts 
that party affiliation ended up playing a key role in an individual‟s feelings on secession.  
Crutcher‟s work is an interesting counterpoint to Johnson‟s because he points to several 
“planter elites” that did not support secession, even once it was obvious Georgia was 
going to secede.  Crutcher‟s work is similar to this study, but on more of a macro level.  
Featuring excellent writing and research, Crutcher‟s work stands alongside Johnson‟s as 
the standard works on the subject.
5
 
 A number of other works on either Georgia or secession were consulted, but most 
provide background rather than direct light upon the secession debate in Southwest 
Georgia.  Anthony Gene Carey‟s Parties, Slavery, and the Union in Antebellum Georgia 
was published in 1997 and gives an excellent background to the politics of antebellum 
                                                 
4
   Michael P. Johnson, Toward a Patriarchal Republic: The Secession of Georgia (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1977). 
5
   Luke F. Crutcher, “Disunity and Dissolution: The Georgia Parties and the Crisis of the Union, 1859-
1861” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1974). 
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Georgia.  Carey also devotes his final chapter and much of his conclusion to discussing 
secession in Georgia.  His conclusions on secession are in direct contrast to Johnson in 
that Carey feels there was little internal discord amongst Georgians beyond typical party 
battles.  In Carey‟s estimation, from the 1820s onward, Georgians battled for political 
office and that is what happened again in 1860-61.  While this sounds similar to the 
argument being made in this paper, my conclusions differ from Carey‟s slightly in that he 
feels that past political allegiance held little sway in the choosing of delegates to the state 
convention in January 1861.  William Freehling‟s The Road to Disunion, Volume II: 
Secessionists Triumphant, 1854-1861 and David Potter‟s The Impending Crisis are both 
considered seminal works on secession and were consulted for background details, 
although neither focus heavily on Georgia.  Potter and Freehling were two of the first 
historians to theorize that secession was not all that popular in the Lower South.  While 
their interpretations are still debated, both are landmark studies.  Freehling and Craig 
Simpson edited Secession Debated: Georgia’s Showdown in 1860, which features 
speeches that encompass the thought of both secessionists and cooperationists.  A speech 
by Muscogee County‟s Henry L. Benning is included.  Published in 1953, T. Conn 
Bryan‟s Confederate Georgia has a useful opening chapter on secession, although it is 
very broad.
6
 
 As for the individual counties, there was a surprising wealth of information for all 
three.  Muscogee County had easily the most primary and secondary sources, thanks 
                                                 
6
  Anthony Gene Carey, Parties, Slavery, and the Union in Antebellum Georgia (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1997); William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion, Vol. II: Secessionists Triumphant, 
1854-1861 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); David Potter, The Impending Crisis (New York: 
Harper Perennial, 1977); William Freehling and Craig Simpson, eds., Secession Debated: Georgia’s 
Showdown in 1860 (New York: Oxford University Press USA, 1992); T. Conn Bryan, Confederate 
Georgia (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1953). 
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mainly to the presence of Columbus.  Some of the better general studies are John S. 
Lupold, Columbus, Georgia, 1828-1978; Joseph B. Mahan, Columbus: Georgia’s Fall 
Line Trading Town; Margaret L. Whitehead and Barbara Bogart, City of Progress: A 
History of Columbus, Georgia; John H. Martin, Columbus, Geo., from Its Selection as a 
“Trading Town” in 1827, to its Partial Destruction by Wilson’s Raid in 1865; Nancy 
Telfair, A History of Columbus, Georgia, 1828-1928; and Etta Blanchard Worsley, 
Columbus on the Chattahoochee.  Of the group, Lupold‟s work is probably the best as he 
is the only trained historian of the group and the others all have some factual errors 
regarding the period studied.  The best work on Columbus‟ role in the Confederacy is 
Stewart C. Edwards‟ “River City at War: Columbus, Georgia, in the Confederacy,” a 
doctoral dissertation from 1998.  Edwards devotes a substantial number of pages to the 
founding of Columbus and its attitudes toward secession from 1850 until Lincoln‟s 
election.
7
   In addition to these secondary sources, the newspapers of Columbus were 
vital.  The Columbus Sun, Times, Enquirer, and The Corner Stone are all available on 
microfilm and are heavily quoted throughout this work.  These papers were especially 
useful because they all espoused various opinions on secession and featured excellent 
letters to the editor.   
                                                 
7
   John S. Lupold, Columbus, Georgia, 1828-1978 (Columbus: Columbus Sesquicentennial, 1978); Joseph 
B. Mahan, Columbus: Georgia’s Fall Line Trading Town (Northridge, CA: Windsor, 1976); Margaret L. 
Whitehead and Barbara Bogart, City of Progress: A History of Columbus, Georgia (Columbus: Columbus 
Office Supply Co., 1978); John H. Martin, Columbus, Geo., from Its Selection as a “Trading Town” in 
1827, to its Partial Destruction by Wilson’s Raid in 1865 (Columbus: T. Gilbert, 1874-75); Nancy Telfair, 
A History of Columbus, Georgia, 1828-1928 (Columbus: Historical Publication Co., 1929); and Etta 
Blanchard Worsley, Columbus on the Chattahoochee (Columbus: Columbus Office Supply Co., 1951).  
The two works on Columbus‟ role in the Confederacy are  Diffee William Standard, Columbus, Georgia, in 
the Confederacy (New York: William-Frederick Press, 1954) and Stewart C. Edwards, “River City at War: 
Columbus, Georgia, in the Confederacy” (Ph.D. diss., Florida State University, 1998).    
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 The research on Thomas County owes a debt of gratitude to former Florida State 
University professor William Warren Rogers, who has produced four books on the 
county‟s history and another two on plantations located in the county.  Two of these 
works, Ante-Bellum Thomas County and Thomas County During the Civil War, were 
relied upon heavily.  Rogers also wrote an article, titled “The Way They Were: Thomas 
Countians in 1860,” that gives excellent information on the county on the eve of 
secession.  Although two newspapers were published in the county at the time, the 
Thomasville Southern Enterprise is the only paper extant.  However, this paper was very 
useful because it represented the majority of the citizens of the county due to its backing 
of John Bell in the 1860 Presidential election and cooperationist candidates.  
Furthermore, the Southern Enterprise was the more popular newspaper in the county with 
a much larger circulation that its Democratic competitor.
8
   
 Perhaps thanks to the fact that Albany became the leading economic center of 
extreme southwest Georgia, there is a wealth of information on Dougherty County.  
There are two secondary sources that stand out.  First, The Historical Background of 
Dougherty County, 1836-1940, was compiled by the Works Progress Administration and 
features excellent work on antebellum Dougherty County.  Second, Susan O‟Donovan‟s 
“Transforming Work: Slavery, Free Labor, and the Household in Southwest Georgia, 
1850-1880” is a doctoral dissertation that does not focus on politics, but it features 
excellent primary source research and a good chapter on Dougherty County (which 
features a bit of information on Thomas) during the secession period.  Much like Thomas 
                                                 
8
  William Warren Rogers, Ante-Bellum Thomas County, 1825-1861 (Tallahassee: Florida State University 
Press, 1963); Rogers, Thomas County During the Civil War (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 
1964); Rogers, “The Way They Were: Thomas Countians in 1860,” Georgia Historical Quarterly (Summer 
1976, No. 2), 131-144.  
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County, only one newspaper survives from the time period, although the Albany Patriot 
was the only newspaper published in the county.  Enjoying a wide circulation, the Patriot 
was certainly influential and was stridently secessionist.  It offers an excellent 
counterpoint to the Southern Enterprise, which was probably the Patriot‟s chief rival in 
terms of readership in the most southern parts of Georgia.
9
  
 This study is significant because Georgia was the most important state in the 
Lower South.  Thus, understanding the issues involved in the secession debate in Georgia 
is vital to understanding why Georgia, and potentially other southern states, had such a 
fierce, close contest regarding secession.  Looking at these three counties as a micro-
history is helpful for several reasons.  First, all three counties could be considered very 
typical of other parts of Georgia and the entire South.  Second, despite these similarities, 
all three counties, and especially Muscogee due to its industrialization and the large city 
of Columbus and Dougherty due to its wealth, had features that make their individual 
experience relevant to counties with similar make-ups in other parts of the South.  
Finally, in order to understand the debate in Georgia at the macro level as Michael P. 
Johnson, Anthony Gene Carey and Luke Crutcher attempted, one must be able to 
understand the debate “on the ground” at the micro level.  Through studying these three 
counties individually at the micro level, it becomes apparent that all three counties 
discussed similar issues, although they all came to differing conclusions based on those 
issues.  Still, this shows the importance of this study because these counties‟ thoughts on 
secession came from the discussion of the same issues.  It also became apparent after 
                                                 
9
  Works Progress Administration, Historical Background of Dougherty County, 1836-1940 (Atlanta: 
Cherokee Publishing Company, 1981); Susan E. O‟Donovan, “Transforming Work: Slavery, Free Labor, 
and the Household in Southwest Georgia, 1850-1880” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, San Diego, 
1997).  
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studying these three counties in significant detail that party affiliation played a key role in 
county-wide support for or opposition to secession. 
 
        
Chapter One-The Build-Up to Secession: Georgia in the 1850s 
Georgia was a key state in the Lower South when the secession debate reached its 
crescendo due to its population, political leaders, and economy.  However, the secession 
crisis of 1860-1861 was not the first time the “Empire State of the South” was to play a 
central role in the discussion of disunion.  The prospect of secession had risen during the 
Nullification Crisis of the 1830s but the debate that eventually led to the Compromise of 
1850 saw Georgia take a leadership role among the Lower South states on the issue of 
disunion.  This leadership role would see Georgia help stave off secession in 1850, which 
would lead fire-eaters to question whether Georgia would make the leap out of the Union 
in 1861. 
Soon after the Mexican War ended, debate raged between the North and South 
over whether the annexed Mexican territory would be allowed to permit slavery.  Much 
of the acrimonious debate in Georgia, and throughout the South for that matter, revolved 
around John Calhoun‟s idea of a regional, southern political party in the wake of northern 
agitation against slavery spreading to the territories.  The crisis of the times led prominent 
Georgia Democrats such as Herschel Johnson, Henry Benning, and Wilson Lumpkin to 
advocate for such a political party to present ultimatums to northern states, force 
recognition of southern rights, and defeat the enemies of slavery.  However, some 
Democrats, including Howell Cobb and John Lumpkin, refused to join this tide and kept 
faith in a national Democratic party.  Cobb lamented that Calhoun‟s followers wanted 
“the dissolution of the democratic party, whether the Union is preserved or not”; for his 
part, Lumpkin was sick of “Calhoun, Calhoun men, and Calhounism.”  The Whigs, 
12 
 
 
 
 
meanwhile, simply waited, pinning their hopes on President Zachary Taylor‟s course of 
action with the annexed territory.
10
    
Taylor ended up disappointing Southern Whigs by surrounding himself with 
potential supporters, no matter their party, and tended to slight old Whigs.  Before 1850 
even began, men such as Robert Toombs and Alexander Stephens had left the Whig 
caucus after having a resolution declaring the party‟s opposition to the congressional 
prohibition of slavery in California and New Mexico tabled.  Toombs went so far as to 
announce that he was for disunion if the Wilmot Proviso passed.  With Taylor advocating 
immediate statehood for California and New Mexico, Georgia‟s Whigs were left with the 
decision of backing the President as their link to the national Whig Party or abandoning 
him for their own electoral survival.  Some, like the editor of the Columbus Enquirer, 
advocated sticking with the national party since there was no chance of slavery being 
established in California anyway.  Others thought they could oppose the policy while still 
claiming allegiance to Taylor while a final group considered abandoning Taylor and the 
national Whigs altogether.
11
   
With southern rights advocates calling for a convention at Nashville in June 1850 
and the Georgia legislature passing resolutions that recommended a state convention to 
determine the state‟s response to the possibility of the Wilmot Proviso passing, the Whigs 
appeared to be in trouble.  With the exception of Howell Cobb, most of Georgia‟s 
political leaders, both Whig and Democrat, were beginning to line up against the national 
parties and Taylor.  With the real prospect of disunion on the horizon and Georgians from 
                                                 
10
   Robert P. Brooks, ed., “Howell Cobb Papers,” Georgia Historical Quarterly (June 1921, No. 5), 39-52; 
Carey, Parties, Slavery, and the Union…, 156-158. 
11
   Columbus Enquirer, August 7, 1849; Carey, Parties, Slavery, and the Union…, 157-159. 
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north to south outraged by the potential admission of California, Henry Clay offered an 
avenue of escape to the moderates. 
On January 29, 1850, Clay presented proposals to admit California as a free state, 
organize New Mexico and Utah as territories without restrictions on the adoption of 
slavery, adjust Texas‟ boundary and pay its public debt, end the slave trade in the District 
of Columbia but not abolish slavery there, and pass a more effective fugitive slave law.  
Clay‟s proposal was debated for months, but it was important to Georgia‟s moderates 
because it gave them an alternative to being simply for or against Taylor‟s policy.  
Toombs, who had threatened disunion just a month earlier, now felt Congress could 
probably come to a compromise.  Others, including Senator John Berrien, criticized 
Clay‟s proposals and drifted toward an anti-compromise camp.  The Whigs were 
heartened by the fact that Democrats like Howell Cobb backed the forces in favor of the 
compromise measures.  Public sentiment, and voting, in Georgia would show that the 
anti-compromise Democrats had either misread their constituents or just moved too fast.
12
 
The public sentiment appeared to be one of weariness.  After several years of 
debate and fighting in Congress over the spoils of the Mexican War, Georgia‟s public 
was tired of talking about it.  If Clay‟s compromises could avert disunion, then it was 
worth it.  Many average Georgians either did not think the admission of California as a 
free state threatened their interests or justified such radical discussion.  This sentiment, 
which was not restricted to just Georgia, would end up stifling the southern rights men 
and the Nashville Convention.   Nearly all Whigs wisely distanced themselves from the 
convention as Democrats attempted to claim the meeting was not about disunion, but 
about preserving the Union by flexing the South‟s muscles to resist aggression.  
                                                 
12
   Carey, Parties, Slavery, and the Union…, 160-161. 
14 
 
 
 
 
However, the editor of the Columbus Times disputed this “Southern cowardice” and 
stated that if disunion occurred as a result of the Nashville meeting, “so be it.”13 
The editor of the Columbus newspaper was decidedly in the minority and the 
farcical voting for delegates to the Nashville Convention proved it.  When the April 
elections arrived, few delegates ran, leaving most candidates unopposed, and only 3,700 
votes were cast in the fifty-four counties (out of the more than ninety at the time) that 
even had polls open on election day.  James Gardner, who had stated that Georgians 
should not shrink from disunion, was forced to admit that the lack of interest shown by 
the voters was a “virtual repudiation by the people of Georgia” of the proposed 
convention.  Eleven Georgians were chosen for the Nashville delegation, including Henry 
Benning, Martin J. Crawford, and James Ramsey of Muscogee County, but five of them 
were appointed by the governor, who had the ability to fill vacancies.  Three Whigs were 
appointed, but they were all marginal figures.  Benning, Crawford, and Ramsey all 
became some of the most ardent proponents of southern rights and secession at the 
gathering.
14
   
On May 8, a compromise plan was presented based upon Clay‟s original 
proposals.  The Nashville Convention met a month later and repudiated this plan and 
formulated their own compromise plan.  The Nashville proposal was to extend the 
Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific Ocean with an expectation to hold slaves 
anywhere south of that line.  This was an interesting turn of events as Democrats in 
Georgia and throughout the South had rejected the Missouri Compromise and thought a 
geographical division of this kind was not possible due to northern opposition.  
                                                 
13
   Ibid., 161-162; Columbus Times, March 26, 1850. 
14
   Carey, Parties, Slavery, and the Union…, 162; Edwards, “River City at War,” 42-44. 
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Furthermore, the extension of the line would require congressional legislation, which 
went directly against an 1848 Democratic platform espousing nonintervention on the part 
of Congress.  This led critics to charge that the Nashville Convention was simply out for 
secession and had come up with this “compromise” knowing most northerners would not 
support it.  Furthermore, moderate Democrats such as Howell Cobb were convinced that 
the Nashville Convention delegates and their supporters were attempting to either break 
up the Democratic Party or trying to use the Democratic Party as a vehicle for secession.  
Delegates to the convention proved Cobb right about their support of secession in public 
speeches.
15
 
The Muscogee trio of delegates returned home to find intense debate regarding 
secession.  Unionists and Southern Rights Democrats held barbecues and rallies to 
attempt to win over Muscogee‟s citizens.  On July 16, the states rights‟ men held a rally 
that drew 3,000 people.  Many speeches denouncing the North and the proposed 
compromise were delivered, including one by textile mill owner John H. Howard that 
was considered the most stridently pro-southern oration.  Two days later, the Unionists 
held their own rally that drew a similar number of people.  The speakers, including future 
Governor James Johnson, were adamant that the people of Georgia should support the 
compromise as it could stave off the disunion that men like Howard portrayed as 
inevitable.
16
  
Walter Colquitt, one of the leading Georgia delegates to the convention, stated in 
a letter in a Macon newspaper that the admission of California was a prelude to abolition 
                                                 
15
   Thelma Jennings, The Nashville Convention: Southern Movement for Unity, 1848-1851 (Memphis: 
Memphis State University Press, 1980), 146-154. 
16
   Richard H. Shryock, Georgia and the Union in 1850 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1926), 276-277, 
283-284. 
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and should be met with resistance.  Supporters of men like Colquitt agreed, arguing that 
the North was out to not only dominate the South but also free their slaves and put the 
government in the freed slaves‟ hands.  Benning advocated secession and continued to 
propose the John C. Calhoun idea of an all-southern political party.  In Albany, thirty 
men proclaimed themselves willing to go to a proposed Southern Rights meeting in 
Macon and advocated immediate secession.  The Columbus Times continued to be one of 
the most radical newspapers in the state, asking if southerners had fallen so low that they 
were willing to accept any compromise “our masters choose to give us?”  The Times 
played their trump card when asking, “Are we already enslaved?”17 
Whigs and moderate Democrats retorted by agreeing that the compromise 
measures were imperfect, but accepting them would forestall disunion and kill the 
Wilmot Proviso.  The compromise supporters made two key points here.  First, California 
was going to be a free state whether that was determined by the people or by Congress.  
Second, by accepting the compromise, the rest of the Southwest would be open to slavery 
and the South would get a better fugitive slave law.  Both Whigs and Democrats in favor 
of the compromise advocated the nonintervention of Congress as a laudable alternative.  
Some, like Alexander Stephens, did not think the compromise much of a compromise at 
all, but thought it would “quiet the country” and, more importantly, “the proviso is not in 
it.”18   
The death of Zachary Taylor elevated Millard Fillmore to President and allowed 
men such as Cobb, Toombs, and Stephens to work together to pass the Compromise of 
                                                 
17
   Carey, Parties, Slavery, and the Union…, 163; James C. Cobb, “The Making of a Secessionist: Henry 
L. Benning and the Coming of the Civil War,” Georgia Historical Quarterly 60 (1976), 317; Columbus 
Times, June 18, 1850; Albany Patriot, August 9, 1850. 
18
   Thomas E. Schott, Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia: A Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1988), 123. 
17 
 
 
 
 
1850.  However, sectional antagonism may have actually been exacerbated, rather than 
alleviated, by the compromise.  Most northerners still were opposed to the fugitive slave 
law and the lack of the inclusion of the Wilmot Proviso.  Many southerners disliked the 
admission of California and the barring of the slave trade from Washington, D.C.  The 
compromise did not unify and this led southern Whigs to rail at their northern 
counterparts for not supporting the compromise while southern Democrats were angered 
by their northern counterparts for supporting the compromise.  This led some of the party 
ties in Georgia to collapse, although the old rivalries remained. 
The struggle going forward would be between those who supported the 
compromise and those who did not, even if they did not label themselves Whigs and 
Democrats anymore.  Former Whigs and Democrats did begin to form alliances and work 
together, but when the governor called for a state convention to discuss what Georgia 
should do in the wake of California‟s admission, the battle began anew.  This time, the 
fight would be between Southern Rights men and Unionists.  Some Southern Rights 
candidates and supporters, chief amongst them the always rabid Columbus Times, called 
for immediate secession as the remedy.  The Albany Patriot reported that the county‟s 
citizens were wary of disunion but made clear that Congress needed to keep the South in 
mind when discussing territorial questions.  However, most Southern Rights advocates 
had learned from the Nashville Convention and knew that the greater part of the populace 
did not support disunion.  In light of this, the disunionists called for resistance, the 
meaning of which Southern Rights leaders never really clarified.   However, one 
somewhat brilliant maneuver the Southern Rights men pulled off was claiming that 
bowing down to the North and opposing a regional, southern political party would lead to 
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secession.  The rationale was that accepting the compromise would lead to aggression 
which would foster secession to stave off abolition.   
The Southern Rights men were scattered, though, and their most vocal 
secessionist supporters often played into the hands of the Unionists.  Unionists charged 
that any Southern Rights men who disavowed secession were being dishonest and the 
ones who called for disunion as the remedy for the South‟s ills were the ones representing 
the true nature of the Southern Rights party.  Equal to the tactics of their opponents, the 
Unionists made a brilliant move of their own in not attempting to tell Georgians that 
everything about the Compromise of 1850 was good.  In fact, they were willing to admit 
that parts were not all that favorable to the South.  However, the Unionists relied on the 
average Georgians unwillingness to chance disunion over the territories and made the 
complex issues that had been debated in Congress for several years very simple:  you 
either thought the federal government was a failure and should be abandoned or you 
thought that, although imperfect, being in the Union was better than being out of it.   
Although this was a vast oversimplification of the issue, it was a wise move by 
the Unionists.  It made it seem that if the Southern Rights party achieved success, it 
would mean fatal consequences for Georgia, the South, and the nation.  The tactic 
worked.  By late October the Southern Rights men had garnered little support, so little 
that even John Forsyth, Jr., the rabid editor of the Columbus Times, was willing to back 
Toombs and Stephens.  Forsyth felt that the convention should definitely lay down the 
ground for what could lead to disunion in the future, but felt Georgia should remain in the 
Union at the present time.  Despite the presence of men like Nelson Tift, the Albany 
19 
 
 
 
 
Patriot reported that “a very large majority” of citizens in Albany and what was then 
Baker County favored remaining in the Union and opposed calls for disunion.
19
  
The November election results would prove how wise, or business savvy, Forsyth 
was to change gears.  Unionists gained 243 of the 264 delegate seats and won 65 percent 
of the overall vote.  Despite the best efforts of Henry Benning and John Howard, 
Muscogee County had voted for an entirely Unionist delegation to the convention.  Even 
more important than the overall Unionist vote was what emerged from the five-day 
convention that met beginning December 10.  The Georgia Platform came out of the 
meeting and would have tremendous effects throughout the South.
20
 
The Georgia Platform began with a preamble that praised the Compromise of 
1850, although admitting parts of the compromise were flawed, and stated the admission 
of California did not injure Georgia‟s honor or require secession as a response.  The most 
interesting part of the Platform, though, was the fourth resolution.  This resolution stated 
that Georgia would be willing to resist to the point of secession any act of Congress 
regarding slavery that was inconsistent with the safety of the slave states, any 
congressional prohibition of the intrastate slave trade, any refusal to admit a state because 
it recognized slavery, any exclusion of slavery from the territories of Utah and New 
Mexico, and any act repealing or altering the fugitive slave law.    Nineteen convention 
delegates opposed the Platform, mainly the few Southern Rights members who felt the 
entire Compromise of 1850 had been unjust.  The Southern Rights leaders anticipated 
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continued discord with the North which would culminate in disunion.  The supporters of 
the Georgia Platform thought it gave hope for peace between the sections.
21
 
The Georgia Platform would have wide-reaching influence and repercussions.  
Southern Rights campaigns in Alabama and Mississippi began in 1851 as both states 
broke into similar Southern Rights and Unionist camps.  The Unionists in both states 
trumpeted the Georgia Platform and won large majorities in similar convention elections.  
The Georgia Platform was utilized by moderates and Unionists throughout the South and 
became the cornerstone of southern policy for many years.  The state elections of 1851 
brought the point home further as Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi elected fourteen 
Unionists in the nineteen electoral races.  Finally, South Carolina, still essentially a one-
party state, continued to prattle on about another southern convention meeting in 1852.  
The Georgia Platform had proven so successful across the Deep South that even in South 
Carolina, interest in the convention was minimal and it would never meet.
22
  
The greatest failure of the Georgia Platform, however, was that it never led to a 
unified Union party.  Georgia political leaders such as Toombs and Stephens wanted such 
a party to exist, but other Georgians like Howell Cobb felt like the Unionists should just 
be absorbed by the national Democratic Party.  In fact, the Democrats would effectively 
add the Georgia Platform to their policy, thus making the Democrats look like the 
moderate, true defenders of slavery when a scant time earlier most southern Democrats 
were seen as secessionists.  It was an odd turn of events and one that effectively killed the 
second party in most southern states for several years.  By 1853, many Unionists in 
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Georgia had grudgingly merged with the Southern Rights men in a once-again unified 
Democratic party.  The uneasy alliance would not last for long.  While they may have all 
seemingly been Democrats, Georgians were not all united.
23
 
Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois had for several years been trying to 
organize the territory around Missouri in order to promote a transcontinental railroad 
originating in Chicago.  In January 1854, Douglas renewed those efforts when he 
introduced a bill to create Kansas and Nebraska out of land lying north of the Missouri 
Compromise line.  To secure southern support, Douglas added language to his bill that 
would make the Missouri Compromise null and void and would open Kansas and 
Nebraska to slavery under the auspice of popular sovereignty.  At first, this pleased many 
Georgia politicians as they had been advocating for the right to take their slaves into the 
territories without congressional interference since 1846.  However, the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act would go a long way toward propelling the nation toward disunion due to the furor 
that surrounded it.  And not too inconsequentially, Douglas‟ act would directly lead to the 
creation of the Republican Party. 
When Douglas first announced his proposal, the politicians and people of Georgia 
were happy at the prospect of the Missouri Compromise line being repealed, which they 
felt had unconstitutionally restricted their property rights.  Stephens, Toombs, Cobb, and 
other Georgia politicians backed up Douglas‟ argument that the Kansas-Nebraska bill 
simply espoused the ideas of popular sovereignty and congressional nonintervention that 
had appeared in the 1850 compromise bill four years earlier.  Some Southern Rights men 
also saw the parallel between Douglas‟ and Clay‟s proposals and found them 
objectionable.  James Bethune founded The Corner Stone in Columbus at this time, 
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which was one of the first newspapers to advocate the immediate dissolution of the 
Union, partly in disgust over the Kansas-Nebraska fight.  Congressman James Lindsay 
Seward, a Democrat from Thomas County, had been serving in state or national office 
since 1835 and was one of the few hard-line Southern Rights men to immediately speak 
out against Douglas‟ bill.  Seward and Bethune were clearly in the minority, though, as in 
February 1854 the Georgia legislature unanimously resolved that opposition to the 
Kansas-Nebraska bill “is regarded by the people of Georgia as hostility to the rights of 
the South.”24 
At least in the halls of the Senate, the popular sentiment backed the bill, as it was 
easily passed not long after the Georgia legislature made their feelings known.  The 
House was another matter, but thanks to maneuvering by Alexander Stephens, the bill 
narrowly passed in late May 1854.  The vote made it obvious that any chance of a 
national Whig Party was dead as all northern Whigs opposed the bill.  On the other hand, 
half of the northern Democrats voted for the bill, making southern Democrats feel as if a 
national party could still work.  This led Georgia Democrats to ask their opponents to 
abandon the Whig Party, which most already had, and unite with them under the 
Democratic banner.  Alexander Stephens, who had allied with the Democrats to pass the 
bill, spoke for many southern Whigs when he said that the former Whigs would prefer a 
national organization that represented their interests, but he still was not sure the 
Democratic Party was it.
25
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The importance of the Kansas-Nebraska Act passing for southerners was more in 
theory than in practice.  Although some held hope that slavery could be extended to 
Kansas, climate and soil made most southerners believe slavery would never be taken to 
Nebraska.  Because of this, Georgians and southerners were shocked when the reaction to 
the bill by northerners was one of outrage.  Many southerners heartened themselves 
thinking the only northerners opposing the bill were anti-slavery fanatics who did not 
understand that the Act was no victory for slavery.  However, this would prove to be 
naïve as the events led to a political revolution in the North.  Out of the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act would come the Know-Nothing and anti-Nebraska fusion parties.
26
 
These new parties would have detrimental effects for southerners.  The Know-
Nothings were nativists and anti-Catholics and called for reforms to keep “foreigners” 
from voting.  The anti-Nebraska groups mobilized a diverse group of people and interests 
behind their opposition to the Act and the “slave power.”  The two groups would 
eventually join with Whigs to battle Democrats for electoral supremacy in the North.  As 
early as late 1854, the Whigs and their new allies began to maul the Democrats in 
elections.  Southern Democrats were shocked at this turn of events because it was leaving 
them short of allies in the North as northern Democrats began to distance themselves 
from their southern party comrades in an attempt to stave off the nativist, anti-southern 
ideals the new opposition often espoused.
27
   
Georgia Democrats had even bigger problems when the Know-Nothing Party 
began to spread southward.  As early as June 1854, councils of the party began to sprout 
up in the state.  Know-Nothing candidates in the state capital of Milledgeville and 
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Augusta even won electoral victories in early 1855.  Other areas did not have politicians 
run as Know-Nothings or actively promote the group, but many old Whig supporters and 
newspapers supported the group.  This caused consternation for many Democrats, but the 
Know Nothing Party never achieved as much support in Georgia as it did further North.   
Still, the movement was important even in the South because former Whigs were willing 
to support the Know-Nothings, even tacitly, simply because they opposed the Democrats.  
With no real national rival to the Democratic Party, Georgians like Alexander Stephens 
hoped the Know-Nothings could defeat the Democrats.  For their part, northern Know-
Nothings were willing to try to find some common ground to form a national party.
28
 
In Philadelphia in June 1855, a group of delegates convened to attempt to form a 
national party, consisting mainly of northern Know-Nothings and former Whigs from the 
South.  The American Party, as the Know-Nothings named themselves at the gathering,  
got off to a respectable start as many northern members were willing to find an issue that 
all could agree upon, despite their anti-slavery leanings.  However, sectional differences 
would eventually cause problems as northerners balked at supporting a section of the 
platform that implied endorsement of the Kansas-Nebraska Act.  Southerners insisted 
upon this section being included and this caused many northerners to leave the 
convention.  Georgian members of the party attempted to make the best of it by claiming 
those who had bolted were abolitionists anyway and pointed out that this allowed the 
section in question to be adopted into the platform.  If nothing else, the American Party 
gave anti-Democrats an alternative to stay in the Union with slavery intact.  Because of 
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this, the American Party was able to make in-roads in Georgia as the only viable 
alternative to the Democrats.
29
 
The Democrats, and even some old Whigs, attacked the Know-Nothings due to 
their secretive nature almost immediately.  Georgia Democrats called the Know-Nothings 
in the state nothing but Whigs with a new name.  They further were upset by the secretive 
nature of the organization and, perhaps due to the lack of Catholics in Georgia outside of 
Savannah, the Democrats were also opposed to the Know-Nothings‟ attacks on religious 
freedom.  Even Alexander Stephens, despite the fact he hoped they could be a viable 
alternative to Democrats, found the Know-Nothings to be dangerous because he thought 
their political secrecy was anti-republican.  The greatest charge thrown at the Know-
Nothings, though, was their bearing on slavery.  Stephens, Toombs, and James Gardner 
all stated that they felt the incoming foreigners the Know-Nothings battled against were a 
northern problem.  Furthermore, they all felt that the Know-Nothing proposal to force 
immigrants to go through a longer naturalization process left them in a state between 
slaves and citizens.  This limbo status blurred the distinction between slaves and whites 
and Stephens, for one, felt there was no place for a degraded class of white people within 
American society.
30
 
Perhaps the larger majority of southerners, though, simply saw the Know-
Nothings as a group of northern abolitionists who hid behind nativist speeches.  Some 
Democratic newspapers went as far as to warn southerners who might be taken in by the 
Know-Nothings to be wary of the party because they could be planning to launch 
abolitionist attacks, through southern members of the American Party, in the South.  
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Democrats stressed that the defense of southern liberty and honor could only occur in the 
open, something the American Party still refused to do.  All of this led many Georgians 
and southerners to believe that any northerner who was not a Democrat was an 
abolitionist.  The rationale was that any northerner not willing to express his views in 
public must be up to something.
31
 
Despite the debate regarding this new political party, much of the focus in 1855 
turned toward events in Kansas.  Ever since the Kansas-Nebraska Act had passed, the 
race had been on to settle Kansas and make it either a free or slave state.  In the North, 
emigrant aid societies paid for non-slaveholders to settle the territory.  Meanwhile, 
proslavery Missourians rallied to repel what they viewed as an abolitionist invasion.  On 
March 30, 1855, thousands of Missourians crossed the border to vote in Kansas‟ 
territorial election.  The legislature chosen by this fraudulent vote was overwhelmingly 
proslavery and quickly passed laws protecting slavery in the territory.  These political 
ploys would occur continuously for several years and, along with intermittent outbreaks 
of violence, hastened the development of the Republican Party. 
With the possibility of Kansas equalizing the ratio of free and slave states in the 
Union, southerners suddenly stepped up their claims for the territory.  Many Georgians 
wanted the territory to eventually become a slave state, but they were willing to concede 
its loss to the North only if Congress did not interfere in the settlement process.  The June 
1855 state Democratic convention argued that if Congress did not admit Kansas as a state 
under the current proslavery legislature, it could lead to a disruption “of all the ties that 
bind the State of Georgia to the Union.”  A newspaper editor in Albany agreed, stating 
that the South could leave the Union if “those Northern States” continued to exhibit a 
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“disposition to withhold from us our Constitutional rights.”  The American Party jumped 
on the issue too, as they argued they could succeed in admitting Kansas as a slave state 
where the Democrats had surely failed.  The thinking was that the South needed allies in 
the North and the American Party was more likely to be that ally than the Northern 
Democrats.  Both sides in Georgia were offering protection for slavery and southern 
rights as the 1855 election for governor ramped up.
32
 
With the American Party unable to provide concrete proof that they could provide 
national political strength for Georgia and the South, Democrat Herschel Johnson won 
the governor‟s office with 52 percent of the vote.  While the vote was not overwhelming, 
Johnson had gained on his 1853 victory in every region of the state while his opponents 
had lost nearly 4,000 votes.
33
  The loss in Georgia was an example of the American 
Party‟s results in the South, where the Democrats crushed the Americans in every state 
except Tennessee.   
The year 1856 began with crises for the South as a Republican won a protracted 
battle in Congress for the Speaker of the House.  Further west, Kansas had been divided 
into two hostile camps: proslavery men who backed the legislature in Lecompton and 
anti-slavery, “free-soilers” who had established a second government under the Topeka 
constitution.  Intermittent bouts of violence continued, with the pinnacle being the murder 
of five proslavery men at the hands of John Brown, a self-proclaimed holy warrior 
against slavery, and his followers in May.  This led many in Kansas on both sides to 
believe civil war was at hand and citizen armies were formed.  Columbus newspapers 
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reported in April that a group of residents had left for Kansas to bolster the proslavery 
forces.  Politically, southerners, including Alexander Stephens, argued that the 
Lecompton government was the legitimate one because it had won the election; he 
argued that the free-soilers were simply sore losers.  Republicans and most northerners 
found this laughable and claimed that the Lecompton government had obviously been 
elected illegally.  Toombs offered a moderate solution which proposed a constitutional 
convention in Kansas under conditions that anti-slavery leaders viewed as fair.  This was 
the greatest concessions a pro-slavery senator would offer, but Toombs‟ and other 
moderate solutions were killed by sectional animosity.
34
 
The threat of a Republican Presidential victory in 1856 actually led Georgians 
apart rather than together.  The American Party, both nationally and in Georgia, chose 
Millard Fillmore as their candidate.  In an odd turn of events, the Georgian American 
Party had broken from the national group but had still chosen Fillmore.  The Georgians 
wrote up a proslavery platform they said Fillmore backed.  The Democrats chose James 
Buchanan as their candidate and although many Georgia Democrats hoped Franklin 
Pierce would be chosen for a second term, Buchanan was seen as a moderate with 
southern sympathies.   The threat of John C. Frémont and the Republicans was not 
enough to bring Georgians together, though, as the Fillmore and Buchanan supporters 
painted the opposing candidate as soft on slavery and no better than Frémont.  The 
American Party supporters further argued that their Democratic opponents had been 
duped by their northern “allies” who were just as anti-slavery as the Republicans.  Many 
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American Party members hoped this type of rhetoric would split the Democratic Party 
apart before the election.
35
 
Such a split did not occur, however.  Although Democrats both North and South 
had differing interpretations of what popular sovereignty meant, they avoided fighting 
over this.  Instead, southern Democrats rallied behind the fact that northern Democrats, at 
least some, had helped win the Kansas-Nebraska fight.  The Democrats also shot back at 
the Americans, claiming their opponents were without solutions to the problems they 
raged about.  Many Georgia Democrats made a simpler appeal:  the only way to defeat 
the Republicans and avert the crisis that would occur afterwards was for southerners to 
back the Democrats and Buchanan.  Many moderates and former Whigs took the bait and 
agreed, announcing their support for Buchanan and deriding the American Party.
36
 
What resulted in Georgia was an easy victory for James Buchanan.  The 
Democrat took home 57 percent of the vote and won 89 out of 118 counties.  More 
impressively, Buchanan was even able to win many black belt areas that the Whigs had 
formerly dominated.  The reality, though, was that Buchanan‟s overall victory had been 
fueled largely by the slave states and southerners realized that the threat of the 
Republican Party was certainly not over.  The victory was important in Georgia because 
Buchanan immediately tabbed moderate, and often new, Democrats to positions of 
importance, including naming Howell Cobb Secretary of the Treasury.  Old Southern 
Rights leaders like Herschel Johnson were infuriated by this turn of events and felt that 
Cobb and the like would betray southern rights to promote their own agendas.
37
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The Dred Scott decision would have repercussions as well.  Chief Justice Roger 
Taney‟s decision was decidedly proslavery as he denied that persons of African descent 
could be citizens, declared the Missouri Compromise line unconstitutional, and asserted 
that Congress, and hence territorial legislatures, were powerless to act for or against 
slavery.  This undercut the Republican platform and was in total opposition to the 
Northern Democrat interpretation of popular sovereignty.  It also created an opportunity 
for sectional issues.  Georgians were happy, claiming the Supreme Court had confirmed 
all of their doctrines of the past decade or more.  Most northerners, however, were 
appalled at Taney‟s conclusions and thought it another example of the “slave power” 
controlling the government.
38
   
At the same time, things in Kansas were coming to a head.  Thousands of settlers 
had poured into Kansas in 1857, further bolstering the free-soil majority.  This led the 
Lecompton backers to attempt to ratify the state constitution as quickly as possible and 
without these new settlers having a say.  The Buchanan administration urged all settlers 
to vote and warned the Lecompton men that any constitution not ratified by all the people 
would be rejected.  The new territorial governor, Robert J. Walker, managed to alienate 
southerners when he told free-soil followers that Kansas did not have the climate or soil 
suitable for slavery in an attempt to encourage them to vote.  This made southerners mad, 
but it also did not have the effect Walker hoped for.  When voting occurred to elect 
delegates to ratify the constitution, nearly all free-soilers boycotted the election.
39
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At a June 1857 state convention, Georgia‟s Democrats denounced Walker and 
asked for his removal, but they did not implicate Buchanan and were still willing to give 
the President time to turn things around in Kansas.  Some Democrats, such as Cobb, 
found the resolutions against Walker needless, silly, and damaging for the administration.  
However, the larger issue was what was at stake.  If Congress did not admit Kansas under 
the Lecompton constitution, the Georgia Platform told the Empire State, and other 
southern states for that matter, that the proper recourse was secession.  Some Georgians 
were beginning to feel that secession was inevitable at this point.  Robert Hardaway, a 
Muscogee County citizen who had honeymooned in the North in 1857, found northerners 
to be “overbearing” and “often insulting” when discussing sectional differences.  
Hardaway was sure a civil war was inevitable and felt all he could do was to return “to 
my own people and await quietly the result.”40 
The internal debates between Unionist and Southern Rights Democrats would 
spill over into the campaign for governor in 1857.  The battle for governor would become 
another fight between Democrats and Americans debating who could maintain and 
protect southern rights more effectively.  The Democrats, running Joseph E. Brown, and 
the Americans, who chose Benjamin H. Hill, both used Kansas as a campaign tool, 
arguing that their party could best deal with Walker and the situation in the territory.  
Georgia‟s voters believed the Democrats more, handing Brown just over 55 percent of 
the popular vote.  Howell Cobb, though, was busy in the background warning Democrats 
that Kansas might not turn out the way southerners wanted it to.  Territorial elections had 
been held in October and December and they proved that the state was most certainly 
ruled by free-soilers despite the presence of the Lecompton government.  Northern 
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Democrats were incensed when Buchanan accepted the Lecompton constitution anyway.  
The December election had been boycotted by free-soilers and Buchanan accepted that 
vote even though the October election, which had full participation by both factions, gave 
a clear majority to the anti-slavery faction.  Buchanan hoped his acceptance of the pro-
slavery constitution would win him support in the South.  It did to some extent, but it 
ended up not being worth the support he ended up losing from the North.  In the end, 
Kansas was not even accepted into the Union before secession occurred, but the whole 
debacle exacerbated the schism that had already begun in the Democratic Party.
41
   
Events in 1858 and 1859 in Georgia centered largely on the Democrats as the 
American Party  dwindled away and anti-Democrats searched for a way to band together.  
Georgia‟s Democrats, in one way or another, were all looking to retaliate against Stephen 
A. Douglas for coming out against the Lecompton constitution.  Cobb also wanted to 
ostracize Douglas because the Georgian wanted his own chance at the Presidency in 
1860.  Others, like Senator Alfred Iverson from Columbus, were willing to destroy 
Douglas and the national party and cared little about it.  At a July 1859 speech in Griffin, 
Iverson railed that “Slavery must be maintained—in the Union, if possible—out of it if 
necessary—peaceably if we may—forcibly if we must.”  Iverson and his ilk planned to 
build a party platform that Douglas would never support, thus denying the Illinois 
Senator the chance at the Presidency that he so desired.  The Southern Rights men also 
thought this would bring the northern Democrats in line.
42
 
The October 1859 raid on Harper‟s Ferry by John Brown and his followers only 
strengthened the cause of men like Iverson.  Brown had hoped to incite a slave 
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insurrection in the South, but instead he was arrested and saw several of his followers 
killed.  Brown was hung, but he had a lasting effect on the South.  White southerners 
were terrified and horrified by Brown‟s plot they were even more appalled by the 
reaction of some in the North who trumpeted Brown as a hero or martyr.  A.J. Macarthy, 
editor of the Albany Patriot, felt that anyone who supported Brown should be hung 
“from the highest limb on the first tree” that could be found.   All throughout the South, 
other plots were uncovered and conspirators were only run out of town if they were 
lucky.  At least four men were expelled from Columbus within two months of Brown‟s 
raid.  Perhaps not surprisingly, many of these expulsions were mere witch hunts directed 
against northerners and travelers.  The plot by Brown and the subsequent reaction by 
those in the North had convinced many southerners of all political persuasions that this 
was all part of the Republican, abolitionist plot against the South.  The editor of the 
Columbus Enquirer was sure that the sympathy for Brown was proof of “the inauguration 
of a bolder and better organized system of warfare by the Northern abolitionists against 
the peace and property of the Southern States.”  In Albany, the Albany Guards, which 
had been formed in 1858 in response to events in Kansas, had begun drilling in case 
abolitionists decided to invade the county.  The Albany Guard urged the citizens of 
Dougherty County to examine their neighborhoods to prevent an uprising.  The 
foundation had been set for not only further sectional animosity, but for the disintegration 
of the Democratic Party over the 1860 Presidential election.
43
   
 The decade was witness to changing attitudes in the state of Georgia as a whole 
and in Dougherty, Muscogee, and Thomas counties.  At the beginning of the decade, 
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there were certainly supporters of secession in the state, as evidenced by men like 
Benning attending the Nashville Convention.  However, the majority of Georgians were 
not willing to take such a step as secession and the Georgia Platform only confirmed this.  
When Benning ran for Congress in 1851, he was easily defeated by his Unionist 
opponent.  Events accelerated at such a rapid pace, though, that just a few years later 
newspapers in Albany and Columbus were advocating secession if southern rights were 
not upheld.  Perhaps the key, though, was the breakdown of an opposing political party to 
the Democrats as the 1850s progressed.  With the crumbling of the national Whig Party 
in the middle of the decade, Democrats began to control places like Thomas County that 
they had not won since the 1840s.  The lack of opposition allowed the Democrats in the 
latter part of the decade to advocate for disunion as a viable option to maintain southern 
rights.  It appeared that the advocates of secession had a much more sympathetic 
audience than they did in 1850.   
        
Chapter Two: The Counties 
Thomas County typified Georgia‟s role in the South.  The county bordered the 
new cotton kingdom of north Florida and was close to the black belt of Alabama.  The 
county‟s large plantation system and agricultural base provided significant wealth and 
linked them, quite literally through the railroad, with the Atlantic seaboard.  The county 
was formed in 1825 and was immediately seen as an area where agriculture could boom.  
By 1840, the county was engaged in agricultural production to the exclusion of nearly all 
other activities.  Cotton had become the most important crop in the county and had 
allowed the plantation economy and slavery to flourish.  One historian of the area has 
gone so far as to say that cotton allowed not only the large slaveholders to prosper, but 
also permitted yeomen farmers, lawyers, doctors, and merchants to succeed. Thomas 
County farmers also proved themselves to be industrious by growing sugar cane, sugar, 
wheat, rice, and corn.  They were so successful in these endeavors that the county ranked 
second in sugar production, third in molasses, and seventh in rice production in the state 
on the eve of the Civil War.
44
   
With the county becoming nearly strictly agricultural, this led to a growth of 
slaveholders, both large and small.  In the 1840s, the Whig Party became the dominant 
political party in Thomas County.  As has previously been discussed, in Georgia the 
party, whose supporters tended to be led by plantation owners and large slaveholders, 
were avowed believers in the Union.  They had a fierce rivalry with local Democrats, 
who venerated Andrew Jackson and were often the party of the yeomen farmers and non-
slaveholders.  The Democrats included large slaveholders in their party, but they often 
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appealed primarily to the “common man.”45  With the crumbling of the national Whig 
Party in the early 1850s, the Democrats began to control the county.  The former Whigs 
attempted to oppose the Democrats, even dabbling with the nativist Know-Nothing party 
but were never able to form a cohesive movement, much like the rest of Georgia.  When 
an alternative to the Democrats cropped up in 1860 with the Constitutional Unionists, 
many Thomas County residents flocked to their side. 
By 1860, Thomas County had 10,766 residents.  Of this total, 6,244 residents 
were slaves, making Thomas County one of forty-three Georgia counties that had more 
slaves than whites.  While the population of whites in the county had dropped by nearly 
500 from 1850 to 1860, the number of slaves had grown by over 1,000.  The number of 
slaveholders grew by 21 in that same time, with 403 Thomas County residents owning 
slaves.  This was a scant 9% of the county‟s white population, but interestingly enough, 
nearly 25% of the county‟s slaveholders owned twenty or more slaves, thus placing them 
in the planter class.  The majority of the people who owned slaves in the county owned 
ten or less and this was typical of the South and state.  To say that the residents of 
Thomas County relied on slavery, or were at least affected by it, would be an 
understatement.   Much like many other Georgians and Southerners, the residents of 
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Thomas County had a vested interest in the maintenance of the peculiar institution, 
economically and socially.
46
 
On the eve of the Civil War, perhaps no part of Georgia had better prospects of 
continued prosperity than Dougherty County.  The county seat, Albany, was a thriving 
city and arguably the principal market place of southwest Georgia.  The growth of the 
county and city had been much more rapid and consistent than any other county or city in 
the area.  The local newspaper thought this had led to economic growth for its citizens, 
arguing that Dougherty was the wealthiest county in the United States, with an average 
capital of $22,747 per voter.  Unlike nearby Thomas County, though, this economic 
growth had not led to the growth of the Whig party in Dougherty.  In fact, the majority of 
the citizens of the county were Democrats.
47
 
Dougherty County has its roots in the settlement of the town of Albany.  The town 
was founded in what was then Baker County.   Albany did not grow up by mistake.  The 
town was a deliberate commercial venture, largely the undertaking of Nelson Tift.  Born 
in Connecticut, Tift worked in the mercantile business and in March 1836 went to 
Hawkinsville after receiving an offer for his services.  Just a few months later, in 
September, Tift and a group of men entered into an agreement to found a town on the 
west bank of the Flint River in Baker County.   According to Tift, the town “was 
commenced in October, 1836, in an unbroken pine forest by the construction of two log 
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houses.”  By January 1837, the town had been laid out and a steamboat made its first trip 
up the Flint River from Apalachicola, Florida.
48
  
 The venture was not an immediate success.  Growth was slow and life was 
simple.  South Carolina planter James Henry Hammond visited Albany in 1838 while 
looking for places to expand his empire and found the town to be “a primitive place.”49  
This benefited Tift, though, who bought up stock from holders who became discouraged 
by the slow rate of growth and frontier lifestyle.  However, things began to head upward 
as settlers began to pour in from older parts of Georgia, and the rest of the South, where 
the lands had become worn from years of cultivation.  As late as 1854 new settlers were 
still constantly arriving, many of whom were wealthy planters from other parts of 
Georgia and South Carolina, not unlike Hammond.  The rapid growth of Albany would 
lead to the formation of a new county. 
 In less than a decade, Albany had grown to have more than 1,000 residents.  This 
growth was much more rapid than in other parts of the county and naturally led to 
clamoring for the creation of a new county.  However, it was not until 1853 that 
Dougherty County was created, carved out of Baker County.    Albany quickly became a 
chief rival to Thomasville for the economic leadership of the southernmost Georgia 
counties.  With river trade, railroads, retail stores, and a tiny bit of manufacturing, 
Dougherty County had a strong economic base thanks to its county seat.  However, just 
like Thomas County, Dougherty relied heavily on agriculture and slavery for its 
economic development.  In fact, nearly 75 percent of the population (6,079 of the 8,295 
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residents) in 1860 were slaves and their numbers had risen by about 50 percent from 
1854 to 1859.  As was typical with the rest of the South, (and southwest Georgia for that 
matter), more than half the adult white males in Dougherty County did not own slaves.  
Of the 322 slaveholders in the county, more than half owned fewer than ten slaves each.  
This is not to say that Dougherty County did not have a large group of planters.  In fact, 
32 percent of all slaveholders in Dougherty were in the planter class, which was a very 
high proportion.  Thus, much like most other counties throughout the South, the planters, 
who wielded economic power, made up a large percentage of those who held political 
power in Albany and the county at large.
50
   
 The first sustained newspaper in the area, the Albany Patriot, belied the 
importance of the planter class in the area.  Tift, by now one of the area‟s largest 
slaveholders, started the newspaper in 1845.  Democratic in politics, the Patriot became 
the most important newspaper in the region, both socially and politically, with a 
circulation of more than one thousand after just two years.  This Democratic political 
base would end up being vital during the secession crisis.  As with Thomas County, the 
political background of the county ended up playing a large role in determining the 
support for or against secession. 
Dougherty County certainly fit the mold that many histories have presented of the 
Lower South.  The county‟s economy was clearly built around agriculture.  In 1859, 
Dougherty County produced nearly 20,000 bales of cotton and almost 370,000 bushels of 
corn.  According to census records, there were 189 farms in the county and they were 
comparatively large, with only fifteen farms of 50 acres or smaller.  The land of the 
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county was proving to be as rich as early promoters such as Tift had promised and this 
had led to great economic prosperity for many and the boom of slavery.  Thus, the 
citizens of the county most certainly had a vested interest in the political rumblings of the 
time, for their economic and social concerns.
51
 
 Located on the Chattahoochee River, Muscogee County was established by the 
state legislature in 1825.  The county is located along the fall line of the Chattahoochee 
and was tabbed for development because of this.  By 1828, the county‟s seat, Columbus, 
had been established and settlers began to pour in.  Columbus‟ position on the fall line 
made the town an ideal location for trading and the river‟s water power held great 
promise for industrial development.
52
   
 In many ways, Muscogee County was typical of Georgia and the Lower South.  
The county featured many large plantations and in 1860, 45% of the county‟s total 
population were slaves (57% when not counting Columbus).
53
  Despite the 
industrialization that rapidly occurred in Muscogee, the larger area was dependent upon 
slave labor and cotton.  Still, that industrialization did set Columbus apart.  Noted traveler 
Frederick Law Olmsted thought Columbus was the largest industrial center south of 
Richmond, Virginia.
54
  In fact, Columbus was called the “Lowell of the South” due to the 
cotton and textile mills located in the city.
55
  The planters of the county saw industrial 
expansion as a positive and a new way to earn more on their capital, as well as providing 
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a market for their food crops.
56
  By 1860, Muscogee County helped Georgia lead all 
southern states in the production of cotton cloth.   The county ranked third in the South in 
the value of cotton textiles produced and the cotton mills were becoming the linchpin of 
the county‟s economy.57    
 Barely three decades old by 1860, Muscogee County was the fourth largest 
county in the state (out of 132) with a total population of 16,584 residents.  Columbus 
had grown to be the third largest city in Georgia with 9,039 residents.
58
  Despite its 
relative youth, Muscogee County and Columbus had taken their place amongst the 
leaders of the entire South.  One visitor described the area as “in a fair state of 
improvement and prosperity, quite an important cotton market and cotton manufacturing 
point.”59  The citizens of the county had been able to devote nearly all their energies to 
local concerns and this had allowed the county to prosper.  However, as the 1850s 
progressed, residents found it increasingly difficult to remain insulated from the great 
national politics and issues of the day.  Columbus and Muscogee County became a 
hotbed of activity as the 1850s progressed.  The county had men such as Henry Benning 
that were in the forefront of the secessionist camp while other leaders like Hines Holt 
were amongst influential moderates in the state.
60
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 Dougherty, Muscogee, and Thomas counties were all poised to take leadership 
roles in southwest Georgia as the 1860 election ramped up.  In all three counties, there 
were certainly people who felt there was something to be gained by the election.  Many 
more were sure there was something that could be lost if the results did not go the right 
way.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
Chapter 3: “The serpent to tempt the Eve of the South to peace and quiet:” 
The Election of 1860 and its Aftermath 
 
The election of 1860 appeared to be pivotal to the future of the Union.  The 
Democratic Party had come close to fracturing in 1856 and with the ire on both sides that 
had sprung up in the years since, many felt there was a real possibility that the only 
national party remaining could dissolve.  No matter their political persuasion, the people 
of Georgia feared the possibility of a Republican victory, especially if men like William 
Seward, who was viewed as especially dangerous after his “irrepressible conflict” speech 
of 1858, were chosen as the party‟s candidate.  However, just as in 1856, the threat that 
all Georgians saw in the Republicans was not enough to unify as one to attempt to stave 
off a Republican presidential victory.  Instead, the political bickering that had been 
occurring throughout the 1850s would continue.   
Before the national Democratic Party had a chance to split, the Democrats in 
Georgia once again were fighting among themselves.  With campaigning from Howell 
Cobb‟s supporters, the Democratic legislators called for a December 1859 party 
convention, instead of the previously agreed March 1860 convention.  Not surprisingly, 
the December convention recommended Cobb for President and was met with ire from 
Cobb‟s enemies.  Old Southern Rights foes continued with plans for the March meeting 
and planned on ignoring the recommendations of the December delegates.  Fearing that 
he may lose the nomination, Cobb agreed to the March convention.  Cobb‟s supporters 
urged county politicians to choose delegates who would back up the December decision.  
What emerged was another battle between the Unionist and Southern Rights wings of the 
party. 
44 
 
 
 
 
The in-fighting quickly led nowhere.  Unable to agree on almost anything, the 
convention at first voted to reconvene at the national convention in Charleston.  A day 
later, Cobb supporters attempted to get the convention to recognize the resolutions of the 
December convention.  This was defeated and the Georgia delegates would go to 
Charleston with no instructions and no candidate for President.  Cobb was so frustrated 
that he withdrew his name from consideration.   
Upon arriving in Charleston in April 1860, the Georgia delegation was divided 
over what the Democratic platform should be and who should be the Democrat‟s choice 
for President.  Henry Benning was the chairman of the delegation and was opposed to 
Stephen Douglas being the candidate.  Benning also wanted the Democratic platform to 
include language that would endorse congressional protection of slavery in the territories.  
Unionist Hiram Warner disagreed with this, not wanting to drive off northern Democrats 
with the platform and risk splitting the party.   
The Democrats tackled the platform issue first.  The platform committee was 
controlled by southerners and offered a platform that endorsed congressional protection 
of slavery in the territories.  Supporters of Douglas opposed this and asked that the 
Democrats go back to their 1856 platform which left the powers of Congress open to 
interpretation.  After debating for a week, the convention adopted the platform Douglas‟ 
supporters advocated.  Every Lower South delegation, with the exception of Georgia, 
withdrew from the convention.  The Georgia delegation voted to leave the convention the 
next day, but Warner, James L. Seward, and two others stayed at the convention, 
although they could not vote.  With the whole Lower South gone, a two-thirds majority 
45 
 
 
 
 
could not be had for any candidate and the Democrats chose to reconvene in June in 
Baltimore. 
The reaction to the withdrawal was mixed in Georgia.  In Columbus, Peyton 
Colquitt, the editor of the Daily Times, enthusiastically endorsed the withdrawal, but John 
H. Martin, the editor of the more moderate Daily Enquirer, thought the walkout meant 
dire consequences for the Union and had serious misgivings.  For his part, Benning 
addressed a meeting of the Muscogee County Democratic Party and supported the action 
of the seceding delegates.  Dougherty was the first county in Georgia to approve the 
action of the seceding delegates.  That did not mean that the split did not cause concern.  
A grand jury in Albany noted that “the condition of our government and relations existing 
between the States of this Confederacy are of such a nature as to excite apprehensions 
and forebodings of the most disastrous consequences. “  That being said, this same jury 
recommended “our fellow-citizens to stand strictly upon principle and upon the law, but 
upon no promises or by no contract to the surrender of any of our just rights under the 
Constitution as decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.”  Columbus attorney 
James Ramsey went a step further, advocating for immediate secession.
 
  Many 
Georgians, though, feared that the split of the Democrats would lead to a Republican 
victory in the Presidential election and were not as eager for secession as Ramsey.
61
 
Most Democrats were not willing to advocate secession but opposed Douglas‟ 
nomination.  Howell Cobb thought Douglas‟ candidacy was the main impediment to 
northern and southern Democrats coming together.  Robert Toombs thought the southern 
delegates had erred in focusing so narrowly against Douglas that they left themselves no 
choice but to walk out and potentially ruin the party.  However, Toombs thought at this 
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point there was no turning back:  Douglas could not be the candidate and the platform 
had to protect slavery.  Toombs, though, was willing to let the party dissolve if northern 
Democrats could not understand the southern position on slavery.  This left newer 
converts to the party like Alexander Stephens aghast.  Stephens felt Democrats should 
stand by congressional nonintervention, thus making the fight over the platform moot.  In 
this thought, Stephens was backed up by Herschel Johnson and Joseph Brown, who both 
thought that nonintervention had been agreed upon by the South as the policy to follow. 
62
  
Stephens, though, was more concerned about what the dissolution of the national 
Democratic party could do.  Even though Stephens had secretly hoped for such an event 
to occur when he quietly backed the American party, he now feared that the break-up of 
the party would hand the Presidential election to the Republicans.  What further angered 
Stephens, Brown, and older Democratic members such as Eugenius Nisbet was that it 
appeared the southern Democrats were all arguing over policy.  Nisbet felt arguing over 
abstractions could leave the party in ruin.  Brown feared men like Toombs were 
destroying the party over personal ambitions.  The critics of the Charleston walk-out did 
not disagree that southern rights should be maintained, but the expediency of demanding 
a specific platform or else seemed foolish.
63
 
In this atmosphere, the state convention met on June 4 to select delegates for the 
national convention at Baltimore.  The majority of the delegates, led by Cobb, approved a 
platform that essentially asked for the same national platform the southerners advocated 
in Charleston.  Men like Toombs rejoiced, thinking either the northerners would bow 
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down or the party was not worth saving.  The dissenters did not go down without a fight, 
though.  Around seventy men, proclaiming themselves national Democrats, organized 
their own convention and appointed their own delegation, including Hiram Warner, 
Herschel Johnson, James L. Seward, and James Gardner, to go to Baltimore and 
repudiate any platform that had anything to do with congressional interference.
64
   
In the end, neither Georgia delegation sat at the convention in Baltimore.  The 
convention recommended seating delegates from both of Georgia‟s conventions.  
However, when the majority of the Democratic convention voted to seat national 
Democratic delegations from Alabama and Louisiana, most southern delegates withdrew 
to create a new convention.  Nineteen states were represented at this new convention and 
chose Kentucky‟s John C. Breckinridge, the current Vice President, as their candidate.  
The delegates who had stayed at the national convention, mostly northerners, chose 
Douglas on a nonintervention platform.  Georgia‟s Herschel Johnson was chosen as 
Douglas‟ running mate.  The split of the national Democratic party was official.65   
In May, a national convention was held by the new Constitutional Union party, a 
coalition of former Whigs, Know-Nothings, and others that felt politicians had created 
the sectional controversy and the slavery issues could be resolved by not discussing them.  
The convention chose former Whig John Bell of Tennessee as their candidate for 
President.  Bell would run on an ambiguous platform that essentially called for the 
preservation of the Union and devotion to the Constitution.  While some of Georgia‟s 
non-Democrats balked at the idea of a party with no real platform, many others flocked to 
the Constitutional Unionists as the only alternative to the Democrats.  Whatever their 
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thoughts focused on the party or the platform, Georgia‟s backers of the Constitutional 
Unionists could rally against the Democrats, who they felt were the cause of the 
country‟s problems.  The tension between the Democrats and their opponents had been 
evident throughout the 1850s but was at its height during the 1860 campaign.
66
 
With the fracture of the Democratic Party, many in Georgia felt the contest could 
only end in disunion.  The Republicans may be able to win the election thanks to the 
divided nature of America‟s only national party.  While Stephen A. Douglas had some 
support in the South, the contest in all three counties, and most of Georgia, was largely 
between Breckinridge and Bell.  Supporters of Bell pointed out that the Constitutional 
Unionists were the only true national party and that the Southern Democrats were just as 
bad as Republicans because Breckinridge supporters were viewed as radicals.  Bell 
supporters declared non-Douglas Democrats secessionists and “enemies of the country”, 
linking them with radicals such as William Lowndes Yancey of Alabama.  An “Old 
Whig” wrote that the reason the “country was in trouble” was “old…political parties have 
preyed on its vitals and brought it to the verge of dissolution.” In this writer‟s estimation, 
the Constitutional Unionists were a breath of fresh air compared to the old parties.   In 
Muscogee County, supporters of Bell pointed toward Henry Benning as evidence that the 
Democrats were simply hell bent on disunion.  .  Some supporters claimed the fire-eaters 
aligned with Breckinridge leaders to purposely split the Democratic Party along sectional 
lines to ensure a Lincoln victory, which would pave the way for secession.  Constitutional 
Unionists in Georgia were highly confident that enough men were opposed to secession 
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that playing the disunion card would work in their favor.
67
  Ultimately, the Constitutional 
Unionists argued that slavery was best kept safe in the Union and a vote for Breckinridge 
would put the peculiar institution in peril.   
 Oddly enough, Breckinridge supporters sang the same tune.  The Southern 
Democrats argued that they were the best equipped to defeat Lincoln because they were 
the only true national party, despite having severed ties with the northern wing of the 
party.  Furthermore, most Democratic newspaper editors were quick to point out that they 
were not disunionists.  In fact, they claimed they wanted to preserve the Union, but they 
were willing to threaten secession if need be.  The threat of disunion to protect southern 
rights had to be kept visible but not to the point that a vote for Breckinridge was a vote 
for disunion.
68
  The Albany Patriot‟s editor stated that the break-up of the Democrats was 
due to “the friends of Mr. Douglas” both North and South.  With Breckinridge and Lane 
leading the way, the Union “might be saved.”69     Despite some Democrats‟ willingness 
to claim secession was the only option at this point, the party leadership realized that 
moderate voters were the ones who had to be won.   
A large meeting at the courthouse in Albany endorsed the nomination of 
Breckinridge.  In October, two thousand citizens of Dougherty County attended a great 
mass meeting and barbecue in support of the southern Democrat that featured speeches 
by Robert Toombs and Alfred Iverson.  A man calling himself “Dougherty” wrote to the 
Albany newspaper to say he was backing Breckinridge because Bell and his supporters 
were attempting “to mislead the people” regarding their ability to protect southern rights.  
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The fiery editor of the Patriot was so confident the southern Democrat would win the 
election that he offered to bet $10,000 that Breckinridge would be in the White House 
come 1861.  Democratic leaders throughout the state were perhaps not willing to bet 
money on it, but were confident of a Breckinridge victory.
70
 
 One thing that supporters of Bell, Breckinridge, and even Douglas had in common 
was to portray their candidate as the best protector of southern rights.  Prominent 
Columbus attorney Absalom H. Chappell publicly spoke in defense of Douglas because 
he thought the Illinois Senator was a staunch defender of southern rights and the best 
hope of defeating Abraham Lincoln.
71
  Peyton Colquitt, editor of the Columbus Daily 
Times, told an audience in Dalton that the state‟s only hope was to choose Breckinridge 
because only he would guard their rights.  John Martin, editor of the Columbus Daily 
Enquirer, heard of Colquitt‟s speech and retorted that only Bell truly represented the 
South because most southerners were moderates.
72
  Thomas County planter and lawyer 
J.R. Alexander delivered, according to one newspaper account, a “convincing, eloquent, 
patriotic, and conservative” speech that advised citizens of Thomas County to vote for the 
Bell ticket.
73
  A.J. Macarthy, editor of the Albany Patriot, argued that Breckinridge was 
the only candidate that would allow “Southern rights” to triumph over “Northern 
fanaticism.”74 
In the final weeks before election day, rumors circulated that the Douglas and Bell 
men would create a “fusion” party to prevent a Lincoln victory.  Bell supporters, 
especially, wrote proposals to unite the three sides into one, thinking that would be the 
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best way to defeat Lincoln.  Bell‟s campaign had not been as energetic or effective as 
Breckinridge‟s in Georgia and Bell‟s supporters hoped the formation of a fusion party 
would at least allow one candidate to beat the Republicans.  The Breckinridge supporters 
scoffed at the idea and opposed it unequivocally.  They were sure that this was just an 
attempt by their old foes of trying a new tactic to defeat their candidate.
75
  Ultimately no 
such fusion party occurred in Dougherty, Muscogee, or Thomas counties or anywhere 
else in Georgia.   
 The high point of the campaign in Muscogee County occurred on November 1 
when Douglas and Alexander Stephens visited Columbus.  Douglas had embarked on a 
southern tour to strengthen the cause of Union and challenge the power of southern 
secessionists.  Douglas sought to combat disunion as he realized he would probably trail 
both Breckinridge and Bell in many parts of the South.  Though Douglas did not have 
many supporters in Muscogee County, a large crowd gathered to hear him speak, but 
most remained largely unenthusiastic.  One local paper argued that most people 
“generally turned out to hear Mr. Stephens” the next night at Temperance Hall.76  
Reaction to Stephens‟ anti-secession speech was mixed.  The Daily Times thought it was 
a betrayal of southern rights and deconstructed his speech point-by-point while the 
Enquirer thought it a “triumph of intellect and patriotism over mad, prejudiced and 
excited sectionalism.”77   
 After much discussion, debate, and rancor, election day arrived on November 6.  
Despite all the angry editorials and hot-tempered speeches of the previous weeks and 
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months, voting went smoothly in Georgia.  With their ballots fresh in the box, both sides 
called for all southerners to join together against “the Abolition party.”  After all, while 
Southerners may have been divided over their support of Bell, Douglas, or Breckinridge, 
at least one Columbus editor thought they all “have been united in their opposition to 
this…unconstitutional organization [Republican party]” and past “minor differences 
should cease.”  While “we fear that the vote yesterday has proclaimed our enemies the 
victors” the people of Georgia could still unify against this enemy and let bygones be 
bygones.
78
  The fiery editor of the Albany Patriot agreed, arguing that all Georgians 
should discard “passion and prejudice” in favor of “patriotism.”  Of course, by patriotism, 
the editor clearly meant to the state, not the Union.
79
  The Corner Stone did not care who 
won the election.  Editor James Bethune was “in favor of going out whether he [Lincoln] 
is elected or not.”80  A convention in Thomas County certainly disagreed with Bethune.  
The convention enacted a resolution that clearly stated that while slavery should be saved 
and the North should not meddle with Southern institutions, secession was not the answer 
and slavery was safer in the Union.
81
   
When the returns came in, Breckinridge had managed a slim victory over Bell.  
The Southern Democrat garnered 48.8 percent of the vote in the state while Bell tallied 
40.3 percent.  Douglas finished a distant third with 10.9 percent.
82
  Despite the 
overwhelming support of the local newspapers, Breckinridge managed an even slimmer 
victory in Muscogee County, with 769 votes to 767 votes for Bell.  Douglas captured 160 
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votes in Muscogee.  Thomas County was nearly as close, with Bell holding a 37-vote 
advantage over Breckinridge.  When votes for Douglas were added to the mix, the 
“conservative” candidates had beaten Breckinridge by 71 votes in Thomas County, a 
relatively huge margin for a county that had voted heavily Democratic in the late 1850‟s.  
Lucius C. Bryan, editor of the decidedly pro-Bell Thomasville Southern Enterprise, 
crowed that the Bell victory was one of “conservatism over disunionism” and showed 
that “the intelligence of the people triumphed.”  What Bryan did not mention is that 
Thomas County‟s voters had returned to their roots.  With an actual alternative to the 
Democrats, Thomas County‟s former Whigs and Americans had carried the day.  Bryan 
was so confident that the Bell victory would end the threat of secession he pledged to 
stop all of the political news and pay more attention to literary endeavors.  Breckinridge 
had won Dougherty County easily, with 372 votes to 277 for Bell and just 26 for 
Douglas.  A.J. Macarthy was pleased with the “glorious triumph” of the Southern 
Democrat and was confident Breckinridge would win the state by 10,000 votes.  
Macarthy was probably wishing someone had taken that bet he had proposed a few 
months earlier.
83
  
An important facet of Georgia‟s political situation was revealed by the election 
campaign.  The disunity of the state was clear.  All sides had argued that their opponents 
should forego divisiveness and back one candidate.  However, attempts to unify against 
the Republicans were ineffective.  This was certainly true in Muscogee, Dougherty, and 
Thomas counties, where Constitutional Unionists and Democrats were deeply suspicious 
not only of the intentions of the Republicans, but also of their local foes. Partisanship in 
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Georgia was deeply ingrained and not even the threat, real or perceived, that the 
Republicans posed was enough to unite the political parties of Georgia against Lincoln.
84
 
Within a few days of the election, before the returns had been published or were 
known, it was still thought that Abraham Lincoln would be the next President.  While this 
was not entirely unexpected, many residents of the three counties were still stunned by 
the result.  Showing his disgust the victory of the Republicans, the editor of the Albany 
Patriot declared that anyone who circulated Northern newspapers or uttered pro-Lincoln 
statements should be hanged “to the highest limb on the first tree.”85  Albany lawyer 
William E. Smith thought the outcome of the election left the South in “the hands of men 
hostile to the enjoyment of Southern Rights.”86  While outrage like that of the editor of 
the Patriot occurred, most people of Georgia were left almost speechless the first days 
after Lincoln‟s victory.  This quickly gave way to intense debate about what the proper 
course of action should be for Georgia and the entire South.  On average in the state, 
Breckinridge supporters favored immediate secession while Bell and Douglas supporters 
took a more cautious approach.  Democrats felt Lincoln‟s moderate image had been 
purposely designed to lull the South into complacency.  Bell and Douglas supporters 
were quick to acknowledge the possible dangers of a Lincoln victory but argued a 
Republican administration could be tolerated.
87
   
For secessionists, there was little to discuss.  Most of them had been advocating 
the disintegration of the Union prior to Lincoln‟s victory and only stepped up their calls 
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for disunion.  The editor of the Daily Times was sure that Lincoln would tell southerners 
of “his great love for us…but he is the serpent to tempt the Eve of the South to peace and 
quiet.”  There was only one thing to do: 
 Let us not be deceived.  Let us not be worshippers of a Union, whose spirit, 
 whose life, whose vitality has departed!  Let us act like men.  Let us be 
 equals.  Let us erect, if necessary, a government for ourselves, where the 
 light of liberty will forever shine, and where the demon of abolitionism 
 will never raise his head.
88
 
 
In this spirit of resistance, militia companies were being raised in Columbus, including 
the Southern Guard, which was led by arch-secessionists Benning and F.W. Dillard.  
Dillard also chaired a public meeting on November 9 at Temperance Hall.  The Hall was 
“filled to its utmost capacity” and the unanimous view was that Georgians should not 
submit to Republican rule.
89
  The speakers urged “Southern men…to resist Black 
Republican domination.”  The Times bragged that the “patriotic fire, which now burns so 
brightly in Columbus, could warm with its heat and cheer with its light every city, village 
and fireside in our noble state.”90  As far as these men were concerned, party ties needed 
to be cut so that all southerners could unite against the threat of Republican rule.   
Not long after Lincoln‟s election, the debate quickly became one-sided in 
Dougherty County.  At a meeting in the southern part of the county, a group of planters 
and other citizens resolved that due to the election of men “whose avowed purpose it is, 
and who are pledged to wage an „irrepressible conflict‟ with Southern rights, and with 
that institution which is the foundation of Southern prosperity and Southern society,” it 
was in Georgia‟s best interest to call a convention “to act in the defence [sic] of her 
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interests and her outraged honor.”  The fact that the men purposely quoted Republican 
leader William Seward surely hammered the point home for Dougherty secessionists.  
The editor of the Albany Patriot urged “resisting the administration of Lincoln” and 
promised that even if every other southern newspaper stood “up for submission,” he 
would stand “immovable” and continue to advocate “resistance.”91  A meeting held at the 
Albany courthouse declared that “the State of Georgia ought not to submit to the election 
of Lincoln and Hamlin, pledged as they are, to carry out the policy of the Black 
Republican party.”92  Planter Benjamin C. Yancey, the brother of William Lowndes 
Yancey, agreed, insisting that “immediate secession” was “the only proper mode” of 
response from Georgia.
93
  
Not everyone in southwest Georgia agreed with Benning, Dillard, Yancey and the 
like.  The editor of the Columbus Daily Sun was not willing to make the leap for 
secession just yet.  Surely, the election of the Black Republicans was “to be deprecated 
by every lover of the Union and good government.”  However, since the Republicans did 
not have a majority in Congress, it was felt there was “hope for the future” because 
Lincoln was “powerless for evil” plans to come to fruition.94  At a mass meeting in 
Thomasville on November 17, the majority of the citizens that attended felt a state 
convention should convene to decide Georgia‟s fate, but advised such a convention to 
take a cautious approach.  After all, “it requires many long years…to build up a nation; 
but a very few days to reduce it to anarchy, revolution and ruin.”95 Even formerly radical 
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Thomas County Congressman Peter E. Love decided to chart this course.  Love had 
disrupted a “Friends of the Union” meeting in Thomasville, the county‟s seat and largest 
town, in 1850.  He disagreed with the South accepting the Compromise of 1850 and 
interjected his views upon the Unionist meeting.
96
  Now, ten years later, he backed the 
resolutions of the citizens calling for moderation.  Furthermore, Love was the only 
Democratic Congressman from Georgia who did not speak out in favor of immediate 
secession.  Love believed the South should at least attempt to save the Union and would 
“cheerfully” accept constitutional guarantees of Southern rights instead of secession.97 
Despite Love‟s willingness to go against party lines, this was certainly not the 
norm.  The presidential election campaign had shown that Georgia had partisanship and 
divisiveness that could color post-election politics.  Some disunionists feared that this 
partisanship could lead anti-secessionists to form a Southern Republican party.
98
  They 
further felt that secession was the only way to unify the South.  The impetus was on 
Georgia‟s conservative leaders to prevent immediate secession. 
This partisanship and divisiveness did not go away despite the somewhat hollow 
calls for unity.  Democrats and former Whigs, or at least Bell and Douglas supporters, 
simply took on new labels: immediate secessionists and cooperationists.  Immediate 
secessionists were in favor of their state seceding without waiting for other southern 
states to do likewise.  Cooperationists were harder to define.  Some wanted to simply 
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delay secession until other Southern states could come together and unify to make an 
attempt at cooperation.  Others were opposed to secession except as a last resort.  Still 
others in the cooperationist camp were unconditional Unionists.
99
  What united 
cooperationists, though, was their contempt for immediate secessionists.  They may not 
agree on what course the South should take, but they certainly did not agree with 
immediate secessionists charting the course. 
Immediate secessionists tended to be better organized based on their more unified 
position and came out firing against the cooperationists.  In fact, they did not call their 
opponents cooperationists, but submissionists.  A.J. Macarthy, editor of the Albany 
Patriot, urged southerners that would fall for “the sweet lullaby of the Union” that the 
election of Lincoln would leave the South to submit to the North.  Southerners ran the 
risk of being slaves to the northerners and anyone who was willing to admit that 
submission to the North was “Treason to the soil of his nativity” should let their “motto 
be „Resistance!‟”  The “rallying cry” that should “be heard from the mountains to the 
seaboard…‟Lincoln SHALL NOT BE PRESIDENT!‟”100 
 In Thomas County, cooperationists bristled at the label and Lucius Bryan was 
quick to point out that they simply opposed taking a “fatal leap into the abyss of 
disunion” and thought it “cowardly” to give up their rights in the Union without a fight.  
An editor in Macon argued the real submissionists were South Carolina‟s Democratic 
senators, who had both vacated their seats, and had reduced the majority in Congress 
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opposed to the Republicans.
101
  Many cooperationists further argued that the South need 
not secede.  After all, their best protection was in the Union since Lincoln and the 
Republicans could do nothing to affect the South for they would be protected by the 
Supreme Court, the majority in the Senate, and the majority in the House of 
Representatives.  The Republicans did not have a majority in the Supreme Court or 
Congress and many cooperationists argued that would keep Lincoln and his followers 
from infringing upon southern institutions.  They argued the South was best served by 
staying in the Union and preventing the Republicans from having their way.   
By mid-November, Governor Joseph E. Brown was advocating a state convention 
to decide Georgia‟s course of action.  Brown called for immediate action from the state 
legislature and the governor preferred secession.  On November 21, the legislators 
ordered a convention to meet on January 16, 1861 to decide Georgia‟s fate in the Union.  
The legislature set January 2 as the date for the election of convention delegates and 
adopted a resolution urging the formation of a Southern Confederacy.
102
  The 
campaigning for delegates to the convention would bring the disagreement and debate 
back to Georgia. 
Almost immediately, the factions that had fought over the election of 1860 were 
now fighting over the election of delegates to the convention.  The names had changed 
from Democrats and Constitutional Unionists to immediate secessionists and 
cooperationists, but the game remained the same.  The cooperationist editor of the 
Columbus Enquirer questioned whether a state had “any right to quietly secede from the 
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Union?”103  One of the Columbus Sun‟s two editors felt there were “remedies within the 
Union of sufficient strength to cure all the ills we complain of.”104   Lucius Bryan of the 
Southern Enterprise in Thomasville suggested that the delegates from the county should 
be “compromise men” who would oppose “all rashness and haste.”  These men needed to 
be “cautious and moderate” and having reasonable men from both parties would be ideal, 
but not necessary.
105
  Peyton Colquitt, editor of the Columbus Times,  spoke for many in 
arguing that secession was the remedy for the South, if nothing else than for self-
preservation.
106
  The divided nature of the citizens was further exemplified when R.J. 
Yarrington, the other co-editor of the Columbus Sun, wrote an editorial explaining that 
recent cooperationist editorials in the paper by his co-editor differed “widely and 
radically” from his own views of immediate secession and future editorials would be 
clearly labeled as to who the author was to avoid confusion.
107
  A.J. Macarthy, of the 
Albany Patriot, thought Georgia had no choice but to choose secessionist delegates 
because the alternative was submission to the North.  “Submission is slavery,” Macarthy 
wrote in an editorial, “and slavery is worse than death.”108   
   Letters to the editor poured in to the county‟s newspapers, describing differing 
points of view.  “John Hancock” wrote to the Sun to express the cooperationist point of 
view.  While stating that he was in favor of secession if necessary, Hancock disagreed 
with the notion of separate state action.  Instead, Hancock thought the South‟s only 
chance at success was if the Southern states cooperated.  As such, Hancock thought the 
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state convention was a waste of time as Georgia would likely secede by herself and 
“without any regard to what other States may do.”109  Still worse was the fact that 
immediate secessionists assumed that all of the Lower South states had enough support to 
secede individually.  If this belief was wrong, it could lead to disaster in Hancock‟s 
opinion.  Hancock was simply asking for secessionists to “stop and deliberate.”110  For 
this writer, the only chance at success was through cooperation.   
The vast majority of letter writers in Muscogee County disagreed with Hancock.  
One citizen felt that the South must secede for “her final independence, glory and 
freedom.”111  Waiting for other states to join in would be folly because “each sovereign 
state alone has the right to [secede] for itself, but not for another.”  While Georgia could 
counsel with other Southern states, she could only act for herself.  The thing that bothered 
immediate secessionists was the notion of not only waiting on other states to act, but also 
perhaps refusing to act altogether because one of the “slave States” would “submit to 
Lincoln‟s rule.”112  One of the major rallying cries was that cooperation was “tantamount 
to…submission.”  Several writers pointed out that Muscogee County had had three large 
meetings and all three had unanimously favored “immediate, separate, State 
secession.”113  Dr. John Slappey wrote to the Albany Patriot upset that the North had 
“disregarded” southern rights and urged Dougherty and nearby Baker County residents to 
“never submit” to Republican rule.114 
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A typical moderate approach was provided by an author who urged the people of 
Georgia to choose delegates without party ties to the convention and to trust these men to 
decide Georgia‟s fate “in the Union if they can, out of the Union if they must.”  Most 
importantly, the rights of Georgia and her sister southern states “must and WILL be 
secured.”115  While claiming a spirit of harmony, it became obvious that party ties did 
matter to many with the fate of the state, and country, on the line.  Indicative of this was a 
letter to the editor of the Thomasville Southern Enterprise, written by someone calling 
themselves “Decision.”  The writer stated that “Breckinridge men were moving 
everywhere to have secession” and that Union men would have to show up and vote or 
else the convention would declare for secession “contrary to the wishes” of the people.116  
This argument became popular with many cooperationists as they sought to rally what 
they thought were the vast majority of moderate Georgians. 
On November 24, Columbus held a large pro-secession rally that featured artillery 
fire, 500 “minutemen,” closed stores, and an atmosphere like that of a “holiday scene.”117  
The demonstration also featured spectators and participants wearing a blue cockade, the 
recognized symbol of secession.
118
  Many pro-secession speeches were given, including 
one by former Douglas supporter Absalom Chappell.  However, the speaker that most 
enthralled everyone was Alabamian William L. Yancey, considered perhaps the foremost 
spokesman for Southern independence.  Yancey told the crowd that “secession was right 
and peaceable” and the South should secede before Lincoln took office on March 4.119  
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Yancey had a friendly audience as the people of Muscogee County seemed to be favoring 
immediate secession.  Cooperationists were also struggling for support in Dougherty 
County, but Thomas County moderates had reason to hope as November came to a close.  
All knew that the month ahead would be one of great importance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
Chapter 4: “Cooperative action is yet practicable:” 
The Campaign to Elect Delegates 
 
As December began, campaigning for the delegate spots at the state convention 
dominated discussion in all three counties.  Secessionists like R.J. Yarrington felt that 
“disunion is a matter of time and preparation” and were unwilling to “accept 
compromise.”  Again, the charge of submission to the North was thrown at 
cooperationists, who were allegedly willing to “sacrifice…the rights and peculiar 
institution of our section.”120  Peyton Colquitt felt “the tide is moving up for 
secession…Georgia is too proud of her past honor and glory to submit—Her only hope, 
that of slavery in its dying struggle with abolitionism, is in secession.”121  James Bethune, 
editor of The Corner Stone, continued the line of reasoning that cooperationists were 
really just submitting to the Yankees, but took it one step further.  Bethune argued there 
was “no doubt” that cooperationists “were willing to sacrifice the rights and interests of 
the country for the gratification of their personal ambition.”122  A.J. Macarthy of the 
Albany Patriot felt anyone who did not back secession had to admit the South‟s 
“inferiority and submit.”  Cooperationists were prattling on about “school boy nonsense” 
and had to realize that the South had to resist the Republicans.
123
  The talk of all 
Georgians uniting regardless of political party or outlook was quickly taking a backseat 
in these heady times. 
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After staying somewhat silent for much of November, the cooperationists 
throughout the state finally began to rally in December.  Prominent Georgians such as 
Alexander Stephens and B.H. Hill spoke out in favor of cooperationism.  In Columbus, 
State Senator Hines Holt “denied that the election of Lincoln…was any cause for 
resistance.”  Holt admitted that the Southern states had suffered wrongs at the hands of 
the North, but Lincoln‟s election did not “justify secession.”124  Holt went so far as to 
introduce a series of resolutions in the state legislature aimed at staving off secession, but 
all such efforts were defeated.  Fifteen cooperationist subscribers to the Times cancelled 
their subscriptions to the paper because of the “dishonorable…and dangerous” opinions 
the paper was espousing.
125
   
Advocating the cooperationist cause could be dangerous though.  When 
bricklayer William Stewart admitted he had voted for Bell and now was in favor of 
cooperationist candidates for the convention, Dougherty County planter Thomas 
Moughan and his overseer J.L. Dozier ran Stewart out of the county.  Perhaps Albany 
bookseller L.E. Welch, who had been born in the North, took notice.  Welch burned 
every issue of Harper’s Magazine he had in the middle of Broad Street.126  The audience 
that watched were elated and the editor of the Patriot thought this proved Welch was 
“with us.”127 
The cooperationists wanted to delay the state‟s final decision to either give 
Lincoln time to redress grievances or to give southern states time to unite and cooperate.  
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Many cooperationists were not uncritical defenders of the Union, but they were quick to 
point out that the South faced no immediate harm.  Thus, in Lucius Bryan‟s opinion, the 
“Precipitators” were attempting “to force all who differ with them in opinion, to go for 
secession.”  While this was a time where southerners should unite as one, the 
cooperationists argued that these Democratic fire-eaters were leading the South down 
“such a course” that would be “most ineffectual.”  The “secession of the cotton States 
would be a surrender of their rights” and thus moderation was the right course.128     
 The main problem that cooperationists were having was their contempt for 
secessionist leaders.  Opponents thought secessionist leaders rash, demagogic 
Breckinridge supporters.  According to cooperationists, the Southern Democrats were 
petulant men who were risking everything to be the leaders of a new nation since they no 
longer held power in the Union.
129
  Lucius Bryan thought the secessionist leaders clearly 
sprang from “the old Democratic party” and were determined to “rule or ruin.”  One 
“strong Breckinridge man from Thomasville” stated that if the Southern Democrat came 
and made Unionist speeches “he would be tarred and feathered.”130  Before the election, 
Bryan railed, these Breckinridge supporters had claimed to be “the best Union men in the 
country,” but now they were willing to disavow their own candidate for President simply 
because he might consider advocating staying in the Union.
131
  Cooperationists argued 
Breckinridge supporters were nothing but disunionists and Bell and Douglas men had 
their proof in their opponents‟ actions. In fact, the upcoming state convention was viewed 
as simply a way to settle old political scores.  Lucius Bryan agreed with the editor of the 
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Vicksburg Whig, who thought that secessionists were attempting to scare the citizens of 
Georgia out of the Union, something that he viewed as “base cowardly, and unmanly.”132  
Secession was considered rash because it posed economic problems and could jeopardize 
slavery, among other things, but one of the biggest problems was that Democrats were at 
the forefront of secessionist leadership. 
 Lucius C. Bryan, editor of the Thomasville Southern Enterprise, laid out the case 
against secession in a lengthy editorial published December 12, 1860.  Under the 
Constitution, the South, he contended, had grown to “be a great, prosperous and happy 
people” and was almost perfect, if not for “internal dissensions.”  Even though nothing 
had been done by the Federal government that would necessitate secession, Breckinridge 
men, who were “not very smart,” were willing to advocate for secession for things that 
might occur.  And even though slavery had been a divisive topic, Bryan argued the 
South‟s peculiar institution was better off for the discussion because slavery was now 
defended by the Constitution and not regarded as evil.  It was neither brave nor patriotic 
to invite civil war for something that might happen.  Yet, these fire-eaters had “rejoiced 
at the split” of the Democratic Party because they believed it would end with the 
“dissolution of the Union.”  People who would support such men should consider 
themselves “literally insane” if they thought these secessionists were leading them to 
some promised land.  These men were not statesmen, as they refused to even attempt 
compromise and acted as if secession was inevitable.  The people of Thomas County and 
the entire South needed to “be cautious.”133  Bryan argued forcefully that Thomas 
Countians needed to vote for cooperationists come January 2. 
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 With the two sides laying out their cases, it was time to choose their tickets for the 
convention that would meet in January.  In Muscogee County, the secessionists met on 
December 11 and chose three of their familiar leaders in Henry Benning, James Ramsey, 
and A.S. Rutherford as their delegates.  All three were prominent men who had espoused 
secession for several years, with Benning and Ramsey being avowed secessionists since 
1850.  Benning especially had been rallying the troops throughout Georgia.  He had given 
a speech on November 19 to the state legislature in which he predicted the end of slavery 
by Republicans and that this would cause severe social and economic problems for the 
South.  Benning stated that secession would be “a complete remedy” for Georgia “and if 
nothing else will save us but going out of the Union, we must go out of the Union.”134  
Benning‟s speech had been met with great fanfare in Muscogee County and he had spent 
the weeks afterwards traveling around Muscogee and neighboring counties drumming up 
secessionist feeling.
135
  The secession ticket was supported by a large contingent of 
citizens in Columbus as well as the Times.  The small town of Mount Moriah in the 
county had a meeting to adopt the secessionist candidates as their own, further bolstering 
secessionist support.   
 On the same day the secessionists chose their delegates, the cooperationists in 
Muscogee County met and chose Hines Holt, N.L. Howard, and Porter Ingram as their 
representatives.  The cooperationist editor of the Sun opined that due to the large numbers 
of men who turned up to choose delegates the cooperationist candidates “would be 
elected by an overwhelming majority.”136  The cooperationists also had the backing of the 
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Enquirer, but the Times scoffed at the ticket, derisively stating that “less than a hundred 
conservatives assembled” and were amazed the cooperationists would “venture to run a 
ticket.”137  Holt, Howard, and Ingram all signed a letter to the people of the county stating 
that they believed “cooperative action is yet practicable.”138   
 On Saturday, December 14, the citizens of Thomas County met to pick their 
candidates for the state convention.  Unlike in Muscogee, the citizens of Thomas County 
held one mass meeting.  The goal of the meeting was to provide three candidates that 
everyone could agree upon so that when voting occurred on January 2, the decision on 
who to vote for would be done already.  According to newspaper accounts, citizens of all 
political persuasions attended the meeting, jockeying for their views to carry the day.  A 
committee was formed to present candidates and the initial proposal was for Augustin H. 
Hansell, J.R. Alexander, and Samuel B. Spencer to be the candidates for the convention.  
Alexander declined and was replaced by William G. Ponder.  On the very first motion, 
the three candidates were nominated and the meeting adjourned.   
 Thomas Countians were opposed to immediate and unconditional secession and 
this was evidenced by the choices of Hansell, Spencer, and Ponder.  Hansell, Spencer, 
and Ponder had all been publicly opposed to immediate secession.  The secessionists 
thought they had Spencer in their camp, but he stated he was “for secession „only as a last 
resort‟” and had been a Bell elector.139  Spencer and Hansell were both founding 
members of the Presbyterian Church in Thomasville and that could have affected their 
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stance on secession.
140
  Spencer was a lawyer, militia officer, and owned fourteen slaves 
and had come out in favor of cooperationism with full force.  Still, he was willing to 
support secession if the North would not guarantee southern rights and was probably the 
most “radical” of the three.  Hansell was the Judge of the Superior Court of the Southern 
Circuit and had not held any political office.  The highly esteemed lawyer was probably 
the most moderate of the three delegates chosen.
141
  Ponder was the only planter of the 
three, owning fourteen slaves in Thomas County and also maintaining an absentee 
plantation in neighboring Leon County, Florida which held nearly one hundred slaves.
142
  
Ponder had been elected to the state Senate in 1855, but had held no political office since 
and had not been very active in politics.  All three were opposed to immediate secession 
and cooperationists thought they were “on the side of prudence and deliberation.”143  The 
secessionists claimed victory, but the fact that James L. Seward, the county‟s leading 
secessionist Democrat, was unhappy with the results was telling.  Subsequently, he 
decided to run for a spot at the convention. 
 Dougherty County residents met on December 11 to choose their delegates.  The 
meeting was designed to be similar to Thomas County‟s in that instead of having two sets 
of delegates opposing one another, one set would be chosen by the majority.  However, 
the chairman of the meeting, D.A. Vason, stated that he would not chair the meeting 
unless immediate secessionist candidates were chosen.  Nelson Tift, who read the call for 
the meeting, assured Vason that secessionists would be chosen and the meeting 
                                                 
140
   Southern Presbyterians, especially in Georgia, were opposed to secession after Lincoln‟s election and 
only gradually accepted the Confederacy, if at all.  For further reading, see James O. Farmer, Jr., “Southern 
Presbyterians and Southern Nationalism: A Study in Ambivalence,” Georgia Historical Quarterly 75 
(1991): 275-294. 
141
   See Martin Abbott, ed., “Memoirs of a Milledgeville Native, Augustin H. Hansell,” Georgia Historical 
Quarterly 57 (1973): 430-438.   
142
   Wooster, “The Georgia Secession Convention,” 50; Eighth Census of the United States, 1860. 
143
   “The Meeting Last Saturday,” Thomasville Southern Enterprise, December 19, 1860. 
71 
 
 
 
 
continued.  Somewhat surprisingly, though, Tift followed this up by stating that he 
thought “secession…a last resort.”  William J. Lawton thought someone from the Bell 
supporters should be chosen as one of the delegates and the meeting tabbed Charles E. 
Mallory as that man.  This was an odd choice considering Mallory, a planter who owned 
thirty-eight slaves, had been published in the Albany newspaper advocating for 
Breckinridge and then secession.  Judge Richard H. Clark was then chosen to represent 
Breckinridge supporters.
144
  Clark later recalled that he supported immediate secession 
because of northern “anti-slavery agitation” and the Republicans‟ attempts to “wrong and 
oppress the South.”145  A.J. Macarthy was pleased with the choices, crowing that the duo 
would win the January 2 election by “such a majority as will make the submissionists 
tremble in their boots.”146   
Evidently the meeting did not satisfy cooperationists as two days after the mass 
meeting that led to the choice of Mallory and Clark as secessionist candidates, Lott 
Warren and Dr. S.L. Barbour were chosen as Dougherty‟s cooperationist candidates.  A.J. 
Macarthy was decidedly less pleased with these two men, arguing that Warren did not 
favor cooperation or secession but Georgia acting alone as a separate state government.  
Barbour, on the other hand, was even more deplorable as he “favors coercion by the 
government of any State that may secede.”  Macarthy urged Dougherty County‟s voters 
not to support these two men.  Otherwise, the citizens of the county may have to “load 
your muskets to kill your Southern brethren!”147     
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The cooperationists of Dougherty County surprisingly did not take too kindly to 
Macarthy‟s editorial.  Nelson Tift, who was not a cooperationist exactly but not in favor 
of immediate disunion, was upset that men like Macarthy were attempting to choke off 
the debate.  Tift was further upset that this was leading his neighbors to call him a 
submissionist.  Tift was willing to back secession if Georgia could not maintain her rights 
in the Union, but thought Georgians should wait a bit longer to see what happened.  He 
could not understand how this made him a submissionist.
 148
   
Lott Warren and Dr. S.L. Barbour defended their position two weeks after 
Macarthy‟s editorial.  In a joint letter, the two cooperationists argued that the election of 
Lincoln alone was not cause for secession, neither would vote for secession if elected to 
the state convention, and that even if several other southern states seceded, they would 
still oppose secession.  Warren and Barbour argued they were not opposed to secession, 
but they felt that Georgia must seek and obtain “the co-operation of the Border States” 
rather than just their fellow Lower South brethren.  They both felt that a convention of all 
southern and border states should meet, demand slaveholding rights in the Union, and if 
that was not possible, then secession could occur.
149
  The editor of the Patriot was only 
too happy to print this letter.  He felt it proved that Warren and Barbour were not the 
proper candidates “to represent a constituency who felt that they endure wrongs which 
require an efficient remedy.”  The cooperationists were offering no remedy but rather 
were “experimenting on the disease while the patient is dying.”150 
 The secession of South Carolina on December 20 only strengthened the cause of 
the immediate secessionists.  Georgia‟s Congressional representatives, with the exception 
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of Thomas County‟s Peter Love, were denouncing compromise and stated that sectional 
reconciliation was impossible, especially with news of South Carolina‟s secession.  
Several Congressmen had signed a letter stating compromise was impossible after the 
Crittenden Compromise had collapsed before the end of the year.
151
  Only four Georgia 
Congressmen did not sign the letter and of those only Love was a Democrat.  This added 
more fuel to the fire that Democrats were disunionists hell bent on secession no matter 
what.  One newspaper editor complained that these Democrats “aggravate instead of 
soften” and “let not an opportunity pass to throw obstacles in the way” of potential 
compromise.
152
  The idea of a vast conspiracy on the part of Democrats to force Southern 
states out of the Union was thus reinforced. 
However, the secessionists did not appear to have to win the war of words with 
South Carolina‟s decision to secede.  On December 21, Columbus held a celebration even 
larger than the one held in November when Yancey visited.  The city was illuminated in 
honor of South Carolina, there were speeches at Temperance Hall by Benning and 
Ramsey, and the night was finished off with a torch-lit procession through the streets 
followed by fireworks.
153
  The party lasted until the wee hours of the night, “the very air 
was ringing with cheers for South Carolina.”  It was reported that “the people seemed 
wild with joy at the glorious news from South Carolina” and it was sure that Georgia 
would “take her place in line among the seceding states.”  The secessionist editor of the 
Sun was also happy to report that his co-editor, who had heretofore been “dark and 
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obscured” on secession, was now in favor of joining South Carolina.154  The political talk 
even made its way down to children.  Harris Chappell wrote his brother that “I have not 
got mouch [sic] news to tell you as we never hear anything but politicks [sic]; I think 
nearly all the people of Columbus is for scecession [sic] as theay [sic] are wearing the 
cockade.”155 
 In Albany, the scene was much the same.  On December 24 the people 
“celebrated the secession of South Carolina by illuminations, music, banners, and a 
torchlight procession,” according to the local newspaper.  Richard H. Clark, Charles 
Mallory, and D.A. Vason all gave speeches championing South Carolina‟s cause and 
stating Georgia would be next out of the Union.
156
  A.J. Macarthy, the editor of the paper, 
was giddy with excitement as he thanked God that Dougherty County did not have 
submissionists who would keep Georgia in the Union “to seek further oppression and 
aggression.”  The secession of South Carolina, he was sure, would awaken the “faithful 
and patriotic” southerners who yearned to resist “farther aggression and dishonor.”157 
The cooperationists were not ready to give up, but their cause seemed lost in 
many places, including Muscogee County.  On December 22, Ingram spoke at a meeting 
in the county, followed by secessionist candidate Ramsey.  Although less than one 
hundred people turned out, there appeared no doubt to one writer that the “great 
enthusiasm” was “almost unanimous for secession.”158  The cooperationists were not only 
having trouble garnering support, but they were also having trouble organizing as well as 
the secessionists, something that held true in Georgia as a whole.  There was hope that 
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disunion could be averted with the upcoming election for convention delegates, but fear 
that reconciliation was impossible due to secessionist leaders.   
 With the year winding down and the January 2 election creeping ever closer, both 
sides made one last push to arouse support.  The Columbus Times, which had heretofore 
treated the cooperationists in mocking language, toned down its rhetoric and admitted 
that Holt, Howard, and Ingram were not submissionists after all.  However, the paper 
could not understand why the three men continued to run when the “people of Muscogee” 
were “against the…policy foreshadowed in the address of the candidates of „the friends 
of cooperative resistance.‟”  The paper promised that “the canvass shall neither be 
embittered or poisoned” but still called the candidates “honest but deluded.”159  All the 
while, the pro-secession elements of Muscogee County, and the state, acted as if 
secession was a foregone conclusion and inevitable.  This general assumption caused the 
most rancor for cooperationists and unionists.  One cooperationist felt it was better to 
“fall in defence [sic] of justice and truth, than to be even victorious and triumphant in the 
advocacy of error.”  Secession was not the answer and it did not show “true 
patriotism…without making a single struggle to maintain” the Union.  To secede without 
even attempting compromise seemed simply unforgivable to cooperationists.
160
 Dr. 
Daniel Lee of Dougherty County argued that due to the financial importance of cotton, 
the “true policy of the North is to let the people of the South govern themselves” in the 
Union.  Lee was confident the South was safe in the Union and that secession was due to 
“party and fanatical impulses.”161    
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In Thomas County, the cooperationists were pulling out all the stops.  Published 
quotes from northern newspapers “proved” that northern opponents of the Republicans 
were everywhere and did not want the South to break up the Union.  At the same time, in 
an editorial, Lucius Bryan pessimistically proclaimed that surely “Georgia will secede” 
after delegates were chosen for the convention because “the plan of the secessionists has 
been successful.”  These secessionists, he claimed, were ignoring “the interests of the 
people” in favor of “prejudice, selfish ambition, or party ties.”  Bryan warned readers that 
George Washington had been scared at the prospect of building the country up, yet these 
secessionists did not tremble at the “appalling magnitude” of the prospect of tearing it 
apart.  The editor urged Georgians not to fall for the trap and vote for cooperationist 
candidates, but at the same time his editorial read like it was written by an angry, 
defeated man.
162
 
 Yet, who could blame Bryan for feeling defeated?  As 1860 wound to a close, it 
appeared that the immediate secessionists were likely to win the majority of seats at the 
convention.  To be sure, Bryan and many other cooperationist leaders and newspaper 
editors felt that the result of the January 2 election would not be the popular sentiment of 
the people.  This may sound strange considering the people got to vote, but Bryan and 
many cooperationists felt the people of Georgia were being bamboozled by secessionist 
leaders who continued to harp on issues that either were not true or could be dealt with 
due to the Republicans not having a majority in Congress.  The cooperationists, however, 
somewhat had no one to blame but themselves.  Cooperationist leaders such as Alexander 
Stephens did little, if any, speaking throughout the state while secessionist leaders, such 
as Benning, Robert Toombs, and Howell Cobb, toured their county, and often other parts 
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of the state, to advocate for secession.  Furthermore, the secessionists even brought in 
people from outside Georgia, such as Alabamaian William Lowndes Yancey, to bolster 
their campaign.  
 As the new year beckoned, there was both excitement and trepidation in Georgia.  
Many residents realized that a decisive moment in the history of their county, state, and 
country was fast approaching.  On December 16, Muscogee County Douglas supporter 
turned secessionist Absalom Chappell wrote his wife: “You can not form an idea what a 
dead stand all business is.  Cotton is no more sold here than if it were mid-summer.  The 
perfect stillness of things is like that which prevails…just before a mighty earthquake.”163 
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Chapter 5: “They cannot represent a majority of the people:” 
The State Convention 
 
Perhaps forebodingly, January 2, 1861, dawned rainy and cold all throughout the 
state as Georgians slogged to the polls to cast their votes for delegates to the state 
convention that would decide whether or not the state of Georgia would remain in the 
Union.  Alexander Stephens called it the “worst day” for an election he had ever seen.164  
Ballots were cast and the waiting game began.  Peyton Colquitt was confident that “we 
have done all in our power to carry the State out of the Union.”  Secession was “the only 
safety for the South” and cooperationists “will repent” when “Georgia has spoken.”165  
James Bethune hoped for a secessionist triumph, seeing the alternative as the victory of 
“allies here to help” the North “whip us in to submission.”166  Very little was written or 
said by the cooperationists, thus making one think they did not like their prospects of 
success. 
 Cooperationists feared that the storms had hampered their cause, but this was 
certainly not the case in Thomas County.  Ponder, Hansell, and Spencer won easily, with 
Ponder receiving 419 votes, Hansell 405, and Spencer 379.
167
  It is interesting to note that 
Spencer, considered the most radical of the three, received the fewest votes of the 
cooperationists.  There was no organized opposition, but James L. Seward, James 
McDonald, and Henry Mitchell ran as immediate secessionists and tallied just 392 votes 
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total, with Seward earning the most at just 178.
168
  Roughly 75 percent of the votes had 
been for cooperationists.  The vast majority of voters had voted for moderation, but knew 
their candidates had stated they would do what was deemed best for the state, which 
could include secession. 
 Despite their campaign throughout Muscogee County, the cooperationists were 
roundly defeated when the votes were tallied.  The secession ticket of Benning, Ramsey, 
and Rutherford garnered 944 votes (67%) to 459 votes (33%) for the cooperationist ticket 
of Holt, Howard, and Ingram.
169
  Still, despite the overwhelming majority, this result still 
showed that secession was far from unanimous in Muscogee County.  As was the case 
throughout most of the state, voter turnout was much less than for the Presidential 
election two months prior.  In fact, nearly 300 fewer votes were cast on January 2 despite 
the momentous issue at hand.
170
  Muscogee County was similar to other Georgia counties 
that contained a major town in that these counties delivered large majorities for 
secessionist candidates.  In contrast, Georgia counties that were largely rural and did not 
have a major town or city tended to be cooperationist.
171
 
 Reaction in Muscogee County was obviously not one of surprise.  The 
cooperationists, however, did not believe the sentiment in Muscogee County represented 
that of the state.  One newspaper editor believed that even if a majority of secessionists 
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were elected to the convention “they cannot represent a majority of the people.”172  The 
rationale behind this was that many candidates throughout the state had not been honest 
and had not run as avowed secessionists.  Instead, there were many secessionists running 
as cooperationists.  Therefore, if the convention did vote to take Georgia out of the 
Union, it should have to be ratified by a popular vote of the citizens of the state.  
Secessionist editor R.J. Yarrington thought this laughable.  After all, “it is at least a 
natural and reasonable conclusion, that the sentiment of the people is largely in favor of 
withdrawing from the Union.”  The people had spoken already and it was “evident that 
submitting that result [a vote in favor of secession by the convention] to the people of 
Muscogee” would be a waste of time “because the vote of the people has been already 
unmistakably expressed through the ballot box.”173 
 Thanks to popular support and their Democratic roots, the immediate 
secessionists won Dougherty County easily.  Clark and Mallory tallied 281 votes to just 
121 for Warren and Barbour.  The editor of the Albany Patriot urged those who favored 
cooperationism to rally behind the secessionist candidates since they represented the 
“declared opinion of the people.”  The editor was sure that the 121 votes the 
cooperationists received were “complimentary.”  What excited the editor the most was 
that he was sure that Mallory and Clark would join with the other Georgia delegates to 
“positively unite on immediate secession” from the Union.174  A letter writer agreed with 
Macarthy, urging Dougherty County‟s citizens to “banish…selfish party action” to get 
behind the secessionsists so the South could have their freedom.
175
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  When the state convention convened on the 16
th
, the outcome was nearly a 
foregone conclusion.  Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi had seceded from the Union. 
Momentum alone seemed to be pushing Georgia toward secession.  However, 
cooperationists like Lucius Bryan felt Georgia should “view the whole ground” and chart 
“her course with that dignity and firmness, which has always characterized her 
movements.”176  Immediate secessionists held a numerical majority in the convention and 
appeared to be better organized as well.  The official Georgia vote total had been 50,243 
for secessionists and 37,123 for cooperationists.
177
   
Immediately, the secessionists dominated the convention, with pro-secession 
former Governor George Crawford being elected President of the convention and 
Columbus‟ Albert Lamar named secretary.178  Commissioners from Alabama and South 
Carolina addressed the meeting and asked Georgia to join her sister states out of the 
Union.  Crawford noted in his opening speech that disunion was Georgia‟s only viable 
option due to the South‟s grievances against the North.     
 On January 18, delegate Eugenius A. Nisbet offered a resolution to uphold 
Georgia‟s “right and duty” to secede and advocated the state‟s participation in the 
creation of a southern confederacy.
179
  This motion was a gauge to see if a secession 
ordinance would pass.  In response, cooperationist Herschel Johnson presented a 
substitute resolution asking the convention to postpone final action until a convention of 
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all Southern states could meet and make a coordinated action.  Judge Richard H. Clark 
remembered that Johnson had a “strong conviction…that for existing causes secession 
was unwise, unnecessary, and destructive.”180  Johnson‟s goal was simply to stall 
secession as long as possible and his substitute motion triggered intense debate.  Perhaps 
the key speech was given by Alexander Stephens.
181
  Stephens said that secession would 
never receive his blessing, but it seemed obvious to him that secession was inevitable.  
Both Johnson and Hansell described Stephens as a beaten man and Hansell later recalled 
that “there were several members near me who had been disposed to wait a little but they 
came at once to the conclusion that it was time to act” after hearing Stephens‟ speech.182  
It appeared that not only Johnson and Hansell but many delegates who had favored 
cooperationism were swayed by Stephens‟ speech.  Following the debate, Nisbet‟s 
resolution passed with 166 in favor and 130 against.  All of the delegates from the 
counties being studied voted in favor of the Nisbet resolution.
183
  With the vote in favor, a 
committee with members of both factions was appointed to draw up an ordinance of 
secession. 
 The next day the ordinance of secession was presented to the convention by 
Nisbet.  In an attempt at delaying secession, Benjamin H. Hill resubmitted the Johnson 
resolution from the previous day, asking the convention to delay action until after all the 
Southern states could convene.  The vote was close, but Hill was shot down 164 to 133.  
Again, all delegates from the counties studied voted against Hill‟s resolution and the way 
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was paved for the secession ordinance to pass.
184
  With Hill‟s resolution defeated, many 
cooperationists felt further resistance was futile and joined the disunionist majority in 
backing secession ordinance.  Nisbet offered the secession ordinance and it passed with 
208 in favor and 89 opposed.  Despite being elected as cooperationists, all three Thomas 
County delegates voted in favor of seceding.  Not surprisingly, all five of the immediate 
secessionist delegates from Dougherty and Muscogee counties voted in favor of seceding 
as well.  Even B.H. Hill had voted in favor, but Alexander Stephens did not, staying true 
to his word.
185
   
 On January 21, the Secession Ordinance was publicly signed before large crowds.  
Six delegates refused to sign, but cooperationist leaders Linton Stephens, Alexander‟s 
half-brother, and Herschel Johnson gave speeches backing the ordinance.  The editor of 
the Times was not surprised by the response of men like Stephens and Johnson.  He felt 
that cooperationists had been “as loyal to Southern interests as the secessionists” and 
would “give all they have and hope for the South and will be found gallantly fighting her 
cause when imperiled.”186   Many cooperationists had said all along they would go along 
with the state and many did.  However, there was worry that secession would not be as 
peaceable as all of the secessionists had claimed.  Further, there was also nervousness by 
the editor of the Columbus Enquirer that the convention had been “a triumph of one 
section” of the state “over the other” and there was genuine concern that the secession of 
the state of Georgia could lead to further divisions in the state.
187
  There was even talk 
that Georgia should not join the other Southern states in a nation because if the old Union 
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could dissolve, what would stop a new Union from fracturing?
188
  Peyton Colquitt had an 
answer, stating that “in unity, there is strength” and the Southern states would be better 
off banding together and their common interests would keep them together.
189
 
Some cooperationists in Thomas County were less enthusiastic about the prospect 
of cooperation with the people they had just been competing with for national, state, and 
regional offices.  Lucius Bryan wrote that southerners had been talking about how they 
had the welfare of the whole country at heart but had actually embarked on a “fruitless” 
assault on the North.  Instead of preserving the country, they had “compelled to surrender 
up that country so dear to our hearts” and now “not one remains to raise a voice” for the 
good of the whole country.  Not so subtly, Bryan blamed the Democrats, writing that “the 
victory of the enemy has been complete.”190  Bryan was so enraged that the ordinance of 
secession was placed on the second page of the paper and in small type.  
 There was little sense of outrage in Dougherty or Muscogee counties, at least 
publicly.  Upon learning of the secession of the state, much of Muscogee County was 
nearly euphoric.  On the night of January 21 the city held its third large pro-secession 
rally, only this time they were toasting their own state for leaving the Union.  The 
celebration was complete with fireworks, speeches, and a torch-lit parade.  The Times 
described the night as “thrilling, entrancing, bewildering—such alone as can be inspired 
by tremendous events and the triumph of great principles.”191  The Sun noted that many 
homes were “brilliantly illuminated” and the positive feeling toward Georgia seceding 
was “more deep seated” than it had been during the demonstration in honor of South 
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Carolina‟s secession in December.192  Muscogee newspapers were more than willing to 
pass along the news that reports from the state at large were happy too, as “all quarters of 
Georgia bring us accounts of jubilee and general demonstrations of joy on account of her 
secession.”193  In Albany, despite unpleasant weather, delighted citizens carried “a blaze 
of living light” through the streets.  People gathered under flags that spelled out “Georgia 
and her Rights! Liberty or Death!”  While a parade marched by, including local militia, 
slave musicians serenaded the revelers.
194
   
 Perhaps the Columbus newspapers were overstating the general reaction, 
however.  Despite railing against abolitionists and the Republicans, cooperationist 
sentiment in many parts of Georgia remained apprehensive, at best, to the state‟s 
secession.  P.W. Alexander, a delegate to the convention from cooperationist Upson 
County (whose newspaper was liberally quoted in Thomas County),  went so far as to 
present a resolution advocating the Union‟s reconstruction “whenever…the full measure 
of the rights and equality of the people of the slaveholding States” could be guaranteed 
just one day after the Secession Ordinance had been signed.
195
  The resolution ended up 
being buried in the newly formed Committee on Foreign Relations, of which Hansell was 
a member, but the idea of reconstruction of the Union would be discussed until the firing 
on Fort Sumter precipitated the start of war in April.  Cooperationists in Thomas County 
saw reconstruction as a possibility because they felt that war was the likely outcome 
otherwise.  With seceded states clamoring for the federal government to abandon 
property in their states, it was feared that war would commence and the states would “be 
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wrecked.”  This upset cooperationists in Thomas County, who were willing to go along 
with peaceable secession, but they had reservations about going to war.  After all, as 
Lucius Bryan argued, “the Seceders have declared their Secession to be peaceable,” but 
were chancing war by agitating the federal government.  What would be the point of 
dissolving “peaceably so great and renowned a Government as this was” to only “go to 
war on so insignificant a question as the territories?”196  This was obviously a shot at 
Southern Democrats, who had been agitating secession over the issue of slavery being 
extended to the territories for many years.    Bryan went so far as to call Democrats 
“absolutely demented” for instigating the “political ruin” that had occurred.197  The editor 
of the Columbus Enquirer complained that Democrats were only out “for the 
accomplishment of selfish ends” and were nothing more than demagogues.198  Despite all 
the calls for unity now that secession had occurred, deep political divisions remained. 
 Within a few weeks, the idea of Georgia being independent started to sink in but 
debate raged over what course the state should take.  Both the cooperationists and the 
immediate secessionists jockeyed for power in newly independent Georgia.  In Thomas 
County, the secessionists had been in the minority, but were now loudly expressing their 
views on how the state should proceed.  To their opponents, like Bryan, this was yet 
another example of “the leaders of that party” attempting to “hold” on to their influence 
and power, only now in the independent state.
199
  The vitriol toward Democrats was still 
there, but it was less about taking Georgia out of the Union and more about who would 
control the state post-secession.  The conservatives in Thomas County admitted that the 
                                                 
196
   “The Beginning of Trouble,” Thomasville Southern Enterprise, January 30, 1861. 
197
   Editorial, Thomasville Southern Enterprise, January 30, 1861. 
198
   “The Value of a Statesman,” Columbus Enquirer in Thomasville Southern Enterprise, January 30, 
1861. 
199
   Editor, “Let The South Prepare For War,” Thomasville Southern Enterprise, February 6, 1861. 
87 
 
 
 
 
reunification of the Union was an admirable goal, but was totally unattainable.
200
  The 
goal had shifted from staving off secession to keeping the Democrats from controlling the 
state and the South.  Perhaps the goals had changed, but the ideology remained the same.  
 The main rhetorical battle centered on the prospect of war.  The cooperationists 
felt that secessionists had the South on the precipice of war and they needed to be 
removed from power.  Cooperationists like Lucius Bryan complained that the hotheads in 
South Carolina, of whom all the leaders were former Democrats, accepted “war with all 
its consequences in preference even to honorable co-operation” among the Southern 
states and this could not be accepted.
201
  John G. Winter was a wealthy Columbus 
businessman who was known throughout the South “for the boldness of his enterprise” 
and “the soundness of his judgment.” 202  In this instance he exemplified the worry of 
war. Winter deplored the “diabolical heresy of Secession” yet what worried him more 
was the fact that secession may result in war.
203
  Cooperationists feared the North would 
not let the South go peaceably, but many cooperationists stated that they would fight if 
necessary.  Secessionists were sure war could be averted, but they boldly asserted that 
they did not shrink from it and were sure the northerners could, and would, be whipped.  
A.J. Macarthy likely spoke for many secessionists when he advised Georgians not to be 
afraid of war.  Macarthy was sure war would not occur and was willing to bet that the 
blood of “every Southern man from being killed in a war by the abolitionists” could be 
soaked up with “a postage stamp.”  Besides, Macarthy crowed, every musket in 
Dougherty County could be placed “in the hands of women and little children…and they 
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can whip every abolitionist” the North could put in the army.204  An Albany man wrote 
that he was willing to fight if that was the price it took for Georgia to be free from the 
North.
205
 
No matter which camp they fell in, the underlying uneasiness regarding war was 
there.  This apprehension is perhaps best described by Columbus store clerk and militia 
member Thomas E. Blanchard: 
 Georgia seceded on yesterday from the United States—the news was received  
 with great exultation and welcomed by the ringing of bells—shooting of cannon 
 & c.—how much I wish all may be settled satisfactorily—and that every thing 
 may soon return to its accustomed channels.
206
 
 
The Southern Enterprise was filled with stories of militias being mobilized, states setting 
aside funds for war, and forts and arsenals being seized.  A convention met in 
Montgomery beginning on February 4 to mark the formal beginning of the Confederate 
States of America.  The hope in Thomas County was that the forming of a central, 
Southern government would lead to a “speedy termination of our suspence [sic] upon the 
war question.”207  The avoidance of war seemed possible after Georgia‟s own Alexander 
Stephens was named Vice President.  If war was required, secessionists and 
cooperationists both were stating the South must unite and preserve their rights together.  
The two sides were beginning to at least agree that they would have to join together to 
defend the South in the event of attack.  Once the realities of war set in, it was obvious 
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that the divisiveness over political matters remained and this has been recently cited as 
one of the reasons the Confederacy ultimately failed.
208
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Conclusion 
The story of Georgia‟s road to secession can be seen in these three southwest 
Georgia counties.  Although Muscogee County did have more industrialization than 
Dougherty or Thomas counties, the three counties still relied heavily on agriculture and 
slave labor for their economies.  However, this study is more useful for how diverse the 
three counties were and how they are useful as examples of other counties throughout 
Georgia.  Muscogee County was one of the larger counties in Georgia based on total 
population, but was also typical of many Georgia counties in that 45 percent of the 
county‟s total population were slaves.  This is typical of the state as whole, whose 
population was 44 percent slave.   
 The one constant throughout the secession crisis was political divisiveness.  
Leading up to the election of 1860, both sides claimed the other was to blame for the 
crisis of the Union.  Both blamed the other for the disunity of state politics.  This mutual 
distrust would remain after Lincoln‟s election and even after secession.  Bell and Douglas 
supporters, many of whom became cooperationists, claimed the Democrats wanted to 
rule or ruin the country, had misrepresented themselves, and had forced secession upon 
the majority of Georgians who were against it.   The Democrats responded by accusing 
the former Whigs of being willing to allow the South to be overrun by abolitionists who 
were out to rob the South of their life and liberty.   
 This political divisiveness holds a clue to understanding why all three counties in 
this study elected the candidates to the state convention that they did.  Thomas County 
would elect cooperationist candidates to represent them at the convention.  While it is 
true that all three delegates voted for secession once they were at the convention, all three 
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were avowed cooperationists.  Despite writing a brief memoir, Augustin Hansell never 
stated exactly why he changed allegiances.  However, his description of Alexander 
Stephens‟ speech showed how much of an effect Stephens‟ statement that secession was 
inevitable had upon cooperationists.  Thomas County historian William Warren Rogers 
believes that all three delegates voted for secession despite their previous allegiance 
because it was obvious there was “no turning back.”209   
Regardless of the delegates, the historiography tries to tell us that Thomas County 
was the quintessential secessionist county.  It was in the Lower South, was largely 
dependent on agriculture for its relatively great wealth, had many large slaveholders in 
positions of power and influence, and the majority of the population were slaves.  Despite 
all of these factors, the majority of the citizens of Thomas County voted for Bell or 
Douglas in 1860 and voted for cooperationist candidates in 1861.  Certainly, there were 
many factors why they did this, but long-standing political allegiance played a vital role.  
Although the county had voted for Democrats in the late 1850s, it had long been a 
stronghold of Whigs and this influence returned when secession reared its head.  While 
this is true of just this one county, it is indicative of why cooperationism or Unionism 
could flourish in a black belt, Lower South area.   
On the opposite side, studying Muscogee and Dougherty counties provide equal 
answers as to how southwest Georgia counties came to support secession.  Muscogee 
County had seen a shift in sentiment during the 1850s.  Henry Benning, Martin Crawford, 
and James Ramsey had all supported secession in 1850 at the Nashville Convention, yet 
Benning was resoundingly defeated by a unionist when running for a Congressional seat 
later that year.  The people of Muscogee County had repudiated secession.  However, by 
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the end of the decade the sentiment had shifted.  In 1859, Senator Alfred Iverson, of 
Columbus, had given a speech at Griffin, Georgia, advising the formation of an 
independent nation of slave states.
210
  Muscogee County voters handed Iverson a 
victorious bid for re-election the following year.  While the states‟ rights candidate in the 
election of 1860, John Breckinridge, only won the county by two votes, the voters gave 
an overwhelming majority to the secessionist candidates to represent the county at the 
state convention in January.  In 1850, the people of Muscogee County were not ready for 
disunion and were largely indifferent to national affairs.  By 1860 and early 1861, the 
majority of the people were active and passionate participants and favoring the 
secessionist cause.  However, there was always a sizable minority on the other side of the 
issue and this led to fierce debate in the county.  Still, the shift in sentiment over the 
course of the 1850s kept course with the advancement of the Democratic party in 
Muscogee County.   
Dougherty County had remained committed to at least the idea of secession since 
1850.  The county was led by Southern Rights Democrats who were not willing to say 
that disunion had to occur in 1850, but they were willing to threaten it and had a receptive 
audience.  Dougherty County voters supported Southern Rights politicians like Nelson 
Tift and R.N. Ely throughout the 1850s.  By 1860, even before the election had occurred, 
influential citizens such as Judge Richard H. Clark, Charles Mallory, Ely, A.J. Macarthy 
and others had been advocating secession.  The people of the county apparently listened 
as Dougherty was the first county to commend the Georgians who left the national 
Democratic convention in 1860.  Dougherty County residents would stay true to their 
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Democratic roots as they overwhelmingly chose Breckinridge for President and 
secessionists as their convention delegates. 
The three counties discussed in this work supply evidence that the battle over 
secession was yet another battle of political parties, just with new names.  Class conflict, 
economic factors, and geography have previously been cited and certainly played a role, 
but political divisiveness and party affiliation need to be studied more carefully to see 
what role they played in Georgia‟s reaction to Lincoln‟s election and subsequent election 
for delegates to the state convention.    
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